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Changelog

All notable changes are recorded here. The format follows Keep a Changelog and versions follow Semantic Versioning. Before 1.0, a breaking change bumps the minor version and anything else bumps the patch. All crates share one version.

Adds the remaining workload authentication methods (HTTP signatures, mTLS, JWT-SVID, DPoP-bound access tokens), asor and RFC 8693 act delegation chains, and a chain view; the lab runs on SPIRE-issued SVIDs and exercises every method through Envoy. Breaking: the server refuses to start with an empty allowed_authorities, and denies access tokens with an act claim unless [act] is configured. For library users, RequestView, CheckInput, GateConfig and AccessToken have new fields, CheckInput::body is bytes, and Method and AuthError have new variants.

  • [[wit_issuers]] takes jwks_file, a JWK set such as a SPIRE WIT bundle, instead of single key files. A key without alg gets the one algorithm its type allows; a key without kid, a repeated kid or an unsupported key fails startup. The lab uses it for SPIRE’s bundle.

  • visado-credentials: a WIT caller can sign the request with an HTTP message signature (draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08) instead of sending a WPT. The draft’s profile and required components, wimse-aud, the created/expires window (max_signature_lifetime, default 60 s), nonce replay and a covered Content-Digest against the received body are checked. Failures are httpsig.invalid with status 400 and an RFC 9457 problem document.

  • visado-credentials: mTLS with an X.509-SVID that Envoy terminated and passes in source.certificate, verified against one CA per trust domain ([mtls]). The certificate key is the AAT holder key. [mtls] needs a loopback grpc_listen unless grpc_reachable_only_by_proxy = true.

  • visado-credentials: SPIFFE JWT-SVIDs as bearer tokens (RS256, ES256), verified against a JWT bundle per trust domain ([jwt_svid]).

  • The PDP context and the Transaction Token tctx name the new methods wit-httpsig, mtls and jwt-svid.

  • Credential headers longer than 16 KiB are denied (credential.too_large) before decoding.

  • The audit event has a detail field with the reason an authentication failed.

  • visado-credentials: DPoP-bound access tokens (RFC 9449) as Authorization: DPoP with one DPoP proof. The token’s cnf.jkt must be the proof key’s thumbprint; htm, htu, iat (dpop_iat_window, default 60 s), ath and jti replay are checked. The caller is Method::OAuthDpop with the proof key as proof_key, named oauth-dpop in the PDP context and tctx. New codes dpop.invalid, dpop.replay, dpop.binding and token.dpop_bound. Server nonces are not supported.

  • A 401 for a DPoP failure carries WWW-Authenticate: DPoP with error (invalid_dpop_proof or invalid_token) and algs; other access token failures send Bearer, DPoP algs="...".

  • visado-chain: a shared dpop module with the RFC 9449 proof checks, used by visado-chain-asor and visado-credentials.

  • Testkit fixtures: DPoP proofs and DPoP-bound access tokens, an HTTP signature signer, a workload CA and X.509-SVIDs, and a JWT-SVID signer with a SPIFFE bundle.

  • visado-chain-asor: Agent Delegation Chain verification per draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03: the parse rules, steps 1 to 5, the DPoP proof of the leaf key (step 6) and the audience and action check (step 8), with denials named as in the draft’s Table 2. A token with a status claim is denied as status_unknown, since status lists are not implemented.

  • The 36 published asor-03 vectors in conformance/asor/, from attenu-io/attenu-guard v0.22.0 (Apache-2.0), all passing. NOTICE records the attribution.

  • The gate verifies an asor chain sent in Agent-Delegation-Chain with a DPoP proof (see docs/bindings.md), with the same caller binding as AAT. Configured with [asor] in the server file, whose required has no default.

  • visado-chain: Profile::Asor03, and the shared json (strict parser and JCS), jose (compact JWS parts and JWK thumbprints) and replay modules.

  • deploy/lab: SPIRE v1.16.0 issues the workloads’ WIT-SVIDs (experimental enable_wit_svids). A one-shot wit-config service writes visado’s [[wit_issuers]] from the SPIRE WIT bundle before visado starts, and demo.sh signs WPTs and AAT holder proofs with the keys SPIRE issued.

  • deploy/lab exercises the other caller methods through Envoy: WIT with an HTTP message signature (allowed, replayed nonce, body changed under the covered Content-Digest), mTLS on a second Envoy listener that terminates TLS with the gateway’s SPIRE X.509-SVID and passes agent-a’s X.509-SVID as source.certificate (allowed, unbound user token, certificate from another CA), SPIRE JWT-SVIDs (allowed, wrong audience) and a DPoP-bound access token (allowed, sent as Bearer). spire-setup writes the X.509 CA and the SPIFFE-format bundle for visado’s [mtls] and [jwt_svid], a gateway-svid one-shot writes Envoy’s certificate, and a new lab_methods testkit example prints the signed and DPoP requests. demo.sh can check visado’s error code as well as the status.

  • visado-chain-act: reads the RFC 8693 act claim of a verified access token as a delegation chain (principal sub, actors from the least recent to the current one) and requires the current actor to be the authenticated caller, directly or through a mapping. Errors are act.not_object, act.missing_sub, act.bad_issuer, act.too_deep and act.actor_mismatch.

  • The gate enforces act chains in a user token bound to a key-holding caller (see docs/bindings.md); a bearer token with an act claim is denied (chain.unbound_caller), as for AAT and asor. The PDP gets only the current actor and the kind of caller it was bound to (caller_kind), as RFC 8693 §4.1 keeps prior actors out of access control; the Transaction Token tctx also records the prior actors and the depth. Configured with [act] in the server file: required (no default), max_actors (default 8) and an [act.actors] mapping.

  • 20 act vectors in conformance/act/, visado’s own except for the claim sets of RFC 8693 Figures 5 and 6.

  • visado-chain: Profile::Rfc8693Act, ActorId::Subject and Link::Nested.

  • visado-credentials: AccessToken has act, id (jti), issued_at and key_thumbprint (the issuer key that verified it).

  • The chain view, off by default ([chain_view] enabled = true): the gate keeps a summary of each recent decision in a bounded in-memory buffer (capacity, default 256), and the HTTP listener serves GET /api/requests, GET /api/requests/{id} and a page at /chain that draws principal, hops (verified or declared), caller, PDP decision and deny reason. Summaries hold identifiers and outcomes only, never tokens, proofs, headers or bodies. It shows caller and principal identities: the server refuses to start with it on a non-loopback http_listen unless allow_remote = true, and answers only the Host names in allowed_hosts. See docs/design.md.

  • visado-extauthz: RequestLog, the recent module and Gate::with_request_log.

  • deploy/lab: the chain view at http://127.0.0.1:8080/chain, published to the host’s loopback address only.

  • The server refuses to start when allowed_authorities is empty; it used to warn.
  • An access token with cnf.jkt sent as Bearer or as a user token is denied as token.dpop_bound instead of token.sender_constrained; any other cnf is still token.sender_constrained.
  • asor DPoP proofs: the signature is checked before the key is compared with the leaf cnf.jkt, and htu is compared after lowercasing scheme and host and dropping a default port.
  • The gate denies an asor chain from an OAuth client authenticated with DPoP (chain.proof_conflict).
  • A delegation chain that names its principal (asor, act) on a forwarded Transaction Token must have the token’s sub as its principal (chain.principal_mismatch), so a replacement token cannot record one user’s chain in another user’s transaction.
  • The server refuses to start when [aat], [asor] and [act] set different required values; a format with required = false used to let requests without any chain through next to one with required = true.
  • The gate denies an access token that carries an act claim unless [act] is configured (chain.unsupported); it used to ignore the claim. A token with an act claim next to an AAT-Chain or Agent-Delegation-Chain header is chain.ambiguous.
  • An internal caller may forward a Txn-Token after a WPT, an HTTP signature that covers it, or mTLS; bearer callers still cannot.
  • The gate removes Signature and Signature-Input before the request goes upstream.
  • The gate refuses a non-UTF-8 body for an AAT invocation itself; the service no longer replaces such a body with a marker.
  • The strict JSON parser, the JWS helpers and the replay cache moved from visado-chain-aat to visado-chain. visado-chain-aat re-exports ReplayCache and MemoryReplayCache; its behaviour is unchanged.
  • The lab’s ext_authz filters set pack_as_bytes: true, as docs/bindings.md asks for signed bodies.
  • deploy/lab no longer signs WITs with the fixed wit-1 demo key. lab_headers and lab_aat take a directory of spire-agent api fetch wit -output json outputs as their first argument.
  • The gate denies a request that carries both AAT-Chain and Agent-Delegation-Chain (chain.ambiguous). The chain context sent to the PDP and the Transaction Token has principal when the format names one.

Adds AAT delegation-chain verification to the gate, the lab, tracing and the project site. Breaking: [aat] must set required, and the gate denies AAT requests that are not one tool call or a plain body-less request.

  • The gate verifies an AAT chain sent in AAT-Chain and AAT-PoP (see docs/bindings.md), reads the tool and arguments from an MCP tools/call body, requires the chain’s holder to be the WIT key when a WIT is present, and passes the chain to the PDP and into the Transaction Token tctx. Configured with [aat] in the server file.
  • deploy/lab: Envoy, visado, OPA with the AuthZEN plugin and an echo upstream in Docker Compose, with thirteen scenarios in demo.sh that CI runs.
  • A Dockerfile for the server.
  • OpenTelemetry: one visado.authorize span per decision with visado.* attributes, exported over OTLP when [telemetry] otlp_endpoint is set. The lab sends them to Jaeger.
  • scripts/check.sh runs every CI check locally.
  • visado-chain: the format-neutral delegation chain model (NormalizedChain, Hop, signer binding, link, assurance) and the ChainDecoder trait.
  • visado-chain-aat: Attenuating Agent Token verification per draft-niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens-02, §8 steps 1 to 7, with errors that name the failing step.
  • The 229 published AAT JWS vectors in conformance/aat/, from tenuo-ai/tenuo (Apache-2.0), all passing. A root NOTICE file records the attribution.
  • cargo-fuzz targets in fuzz/ for Transaction Token verification and token requests, AAT chain verification and decoding, AuthZEN responses and caller authentication, seeded from the conformance vectors. CI runs each for 30 seconds.
  • The Dockerfile pins its base images by digest, and Dependabot keeps the digests current.
  • visado-chain: NormalizedChain has holder_proof. ChainDecoder::decode sets it to false; visado-chain-aat’s Verifier::verify sets it to true after the PoP check.
  • A chain verified on a forwarded Transaction Token is recorded in a replacement token (tctx.chain:<caller>) instead of being dropped.

  • The gate accepts only two request forms with an AAT chain (one tools/call, or a body-less GET/HEAD/DELETE/OPTIONS without a query string) and denies the rest. [aat] required = true denies requests that carry no chain.

  • The gate no longer treats a request that is not one MCP tool call as the path tool: batches, non-JSON bodies, malformed tools/call and missing bodies are denied.

  • A bearer-only caller can no longer present an AAT chain; only a WIT caller whose key is the chain’s holder can.

  • The server requires aud on the chain and aat_aud on the proof by default.

  • visado-chain-aat: the PoP JWT signature (steps 7a and 7b) is checked before the arguments are matched against the constraints (6b), as §8 recommends. Constraint value sets are built once when the token is parsed, each argument’s JCS form is computed once, and a token may carry at most Limits::max_constraint_nodes (default 1024) constraint nodes. A request with a wide any and large arguments no longer costs tens of milliseconds before the sender is authenticated.

  • visado-chain-aat: duplicate JSON member detection is linear, so a header with thousands of members no longer costs time before the signature check.

  • visado-chain-aat: JCS number serialization breaks ties between equally short digit strings to even, as RFC 8785 requires (905750064395076.25 is 905750064395076.2). Digits come from the ryu crate. Before, some numbers were judged admissible or not the wrong way round.

  • visado-chain-aat: with two trust anchors that share a key under different issuers, the root is matched to the anchor whose issuer equals iss, not to the first anchor whose key verifies.

  • visado-chain-aat: decode() rejects an aud that is not a string or an array of strings instead of reading it as unrestricted.

First release. Pre-alpha: delegation-chain verification is not implemented yet.

  • visado-txn-token: mint, verify and replace OAuth Transaction Tokens (draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11), and parse token requests. Errors have stable codes.
  • Transaction Token conformance vectors in conformance/txn-token/ (5 valid, 22 negative).
  • visado-authzen: AuthZEN 1.0 access evaluation client that fails closed, with an agent-for-principal request profile and metadata discovery.
  • visado-credentials: caller authentication with a WIT and a WPT (optionally binding a user access token through oth), or an OAuth access token alone. WPT jti replay is checked in memory.
  • visado-extauthz: the decision pipeline and an Envoy ext_authz v3 gRPC service. It mints a Transaction Token, forwards one only from configured internal callers, and removes inbound credentials before the request goes upstream.
  • visado binary: TOML configuration, ext_authz over gRPC, /healthz and /.well-known/jwks.json over HTTP, JSON audit events. Both listeners bind to loopback by default, and the server exits if either fails.
  • Requests for authorities outside allowed_authorities and paths an upstream could resolve differently (dot segments, encoded dots or slashes, empty segments) are denied before authentication.
  • OAuth issuers can carry a subject_prefix; with more than one issuer, every issuer needs one.
  • Sender-constrained access tokens (cnf) are rejected until DPoP and mTLS binding exist. scp is read when scope is absent, and nbf is checked.