Changelog
All notable changes are recorded here. The format follows Keep a Changelog and versions follow Semantic Versioning. Before 1.0, a breaking change bumps the minor version and anything else bumps the patch. All crates share one version.
0.3.0 - 2026-11-21
Section titled “0.3.0 - 2026-11-21”Adds the remaining workload authentication methods (HTTP signatures, mTLS, JWT-SVID, DPoP-bound access tokens), asor and RFC 8693 act delegation chains, and a chain view; the lab runs on SPIRE-issued SVIDs and exercises every method through Envoy. Breaking: the server refuses to start with an empty allowed_authorities, and denies access tokens with an act claim unless [act] is configured. For library users, RequestView, CheckInput, GateConfig and AccessToken have new fields, CheckInput::body is bytes, and Method and AuthError have new variants.
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[[wit_issuers]]takesjwks_file, a JWK set such as a SPIRE WIT bundle, instead of single key files. A key withoutalggets the one algorithm its type allows; a key withoutkid, a repeatedkidor an unsupported key fails startup. The lab uses it for SPIRE’s bundle. -
visado-credentials: a WIT caller can sign the request with an HTTP message signature (draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08) instead of sending a WPT. The draft’s profile and required components,wimse-aud, thecreated/expireswindow (max_signature_lifetime, default 60 s), nonce replay and a coveredContent-Digestagainst the received body are checked. Failures arehttpsig.invalidwith status 400 and an RFC 9457 problem document. -
visado-credentials: mTLS with an X.509-SVID that Envoy terminated and passes insource.certificate, verified against one CA per trust domain ([mtls]). The certificate key is the AAT holder key.[mtls]needs a loopbackgrpc_listenunlessgrpc_reachable_only_by_proxy = true. -
visado-credentials: SPIFFE JWT-SVIDs as bearer tokens (RS256,ES256), verified against a JWT bundle per trust domain ([jwt_svid]). -
The PDP context and the Transaction Token
tctxname the new methodswit-httpsig,mtlsandjwt-svid. -
Credential headers longer than 16 KiB are denied (
credential.too_large) before decoding. -
The audit event has a
detailfield with the reason an authentication failed. -
visado-credentials: DPoP-bound access tokens (RFC 9449) asAuthorization: DPoPwith oneDPoPproof. The token’scnf.jktmust be the proof key’s thumbprint;htm,htu,iat(dpop_iat_window, default 60 s),athandjtireplay are checked. The caller isMethod::OAuthDpopwith the proof key asproof_key, namedoauth-dpopin the PDP context andtctx. New codesdpop.invalid,dpop.replay,dpop.bindingandtoken.dpop_bound. Server nonces are not supported. -
A 401 for a DPoP failure carries
WWW-Authenticate: DPoPwitherror(invalid_dpop_prooforinvalid_token) andalgs; other access token failures sendBearer, DPoP algs="...". -
visado-chain: a shareddpopmodule with the RFC 9449 proof checks, used byvisado-chain-asorandvisado-credentials. -
Testkit fixtures: DPoP proofs and DPoP-bound access tokens, an HTTP signature signer, a workload CA and X.509-SVIDs, and a JWT-SVID signer with a SPIFFE bundle.
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visado-chain-asor: Agent Delegation Chain verification per draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03: the parse rules, steps 1 to 5, the DPoP proof of the leaf key (step 6) and the audience and action check (step 8), with denials named as in the draft’s Table 2. A token with astatusclaim is denied asstatus_unknown, since status lists are not implemented. -
The 36 published asor-03 vectors in
conformance/asor/, from attenu-io/attenu-guard v0.22.0 (Apache-2.0), all passing.NOTICErecords the attribution. -
The gate verifies an asor chain sent in
Agent-Delegation-Chainwith aDPoPproof (seedocs/bindings.md), with the same caller binding as AAT. Configured with[asor]in the server file, whoserequiredhas no default. -
visado-chain:Profile::Asor03, and the sharedjson(strict parser and JCS),jose(compact JWS parts and JWK thumbprints) andreplaymodules. -
deploy/lab: SPIRE v1.16.0 issues the workloads’ WIT-SVIDs (experimentalenable_wit_svids). A one-shotwit-configservice writes visado’s[[wit_issuers]]from the SPIRE WIT bundle before visado starts, anddemo.shsigns WPTs and AAT holder proofs with the keys SPIRE issued. -
deploy/labexercises the other caller methods through Envoy: WIT with an HTTP message signature (allowed, replayed nonce, body changed under the coveredContent-Digest), mTLS on a second Envoy listener that terminates TLS with the gateway’s SPIRE X.509-SVID and passes agent-a’s X.509-SVID assource.certificate(allowed, unbound user token, certificate from another CA), SPIRE JWT-SVIDs (allowed, wrong audience) and a DPoP-bound access token (allowed, sent asBearer).spire-setupwrites the X.509 CA and the SPIFFE-format bundle for visado’s[mtls]and[jwt_svid], agateway-svidone-shot writes Envoy’s certificate, and a newlab_methodstestkit example prints the signed and DPoP requests.demo.shcan check visado’s error code as well as the status. -
visado-chain-act: reads the RFC 8693actclaim of a verified access token as a delegation chain (principalsub, actors from the least recent to the current one) and requires the current actor to be the authenticated caller, directly or through a mapping. Errors areact.not_object,act.missing_sub,act.bad_issuer,act.too_deepandact.actor_mismatch. -
The gate enforces
actchains in a user token bound to a key-holding caller (seedocs/bindings.md); a bearer token with anactclaim is denied (chain.unbound_caller), as for AAT and asor. The PDP gets only the current actor and the kind of caller it was bound to (caller_kind), as RFC 8693 §4.1 keeps prior actors out of access control; the Transaction Tokentctxalso records the prior actors and the depth. Configured with[act]in the server file:required(no default),max_actors(default 8) and an[act.actors]mapping. -
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actvectors inconformance/act/, visado’s own except for the claim sets of RFC 8693 Figures 5 and 6. -
visado-chain:Profile::Rfc8693Act,ActorId::SubjectandLink::Nested. -
visado-credentials:AccessTokenhasact,id(jti),issued_atandkey_thumbprint(the issuer key that verified it). -
The chain view, off by default (
[chain_view] enabled = true): the gate keeps a summary of each recent decision in a bounded in-memory buffer (capacity, default 256), and the HTTP listener servesGET /api/requests,GET /api/requests/{id}and a page at/chainthat draws principal, hops (verified or declared), caller, PDP decision and deny reason. Summaries hold identifiers and outcomes only, never tokens, proofs, headers or bodies. It shows caller and principal identities: the server refuses to start with it on a non-loopbackhttp_listenunlessallow_remote = true, and answers only theHostnames inallowed_hosts. Seedocs/design.md. -
visado-extauthz:RequestLog, therecentmodule andGate::with_request_log. -
deploy/lab: the chain view athttp://127.0.0.1:8080/chain, published to the host’s loopback address only.
Changed
Section titled “Changed”- The server refuses to start when
allowed_authoritiesis empty; it used to warn. - An access token with
cnf.jktsent asBeareror as a user token is denied astoken.dpop_boundinstead oftoken.sender_constrained; any othercnfis stilltoken.sender_constrained. - asor DPoP proofs: the signature is checked before the key is compared with the leaf
cnf.jkt, andhtuis compared after lowercasing scheme and host and dropping a default port. - The gate denies an asor chain from an OAuth client authenticated with DPoP (
chain.proof_conflict). - A delegation chain that names its principal (asor,
act) on a forwarded Transaction Token must have the token’ssubas its principal (chain.principal_mismatch), so a replacement token cannot record one user’s chain in another user’s transaction. - The server refuses to start when
[aat],[asor]and[act]set differentrequiredvalues; a format withrequired = falseused to let requests without any chain through next to one withrequired = true. - The gate denies an access token that carries an
actclaim unless[act]is configured (chain.unsupported); it used to ignore the claim. A token with anactclaim next to anAAT-ChainorAgent-Delegation-Chainheader ischain.ambiguous. - An internal caller may forward a
Txn-Tokenafter a WPT, an HTTP signature that covers it, or mTLS; bearer callers still cannot. - The gate removes
SignatureandSignature-Inputbefore the request goes upstream. - The gate refuses a non-UTF-8 body for an AAT invocation itself; the service no longer replaces such a body with a marker.
- The strict JSON parser, the JWS helpers and the replay cache moved from
visado-chain-aattovisado-chain.visado-chain-aatre-exportsReplayCacheandMemoryReplayCache; its behaviour is unchanged. - The lab’s ext_authz filters set
pack_as_bytes: true, asdocs/bindings.mdasks for signed bodies. deploy/labno longer signs WITs with the fixedwit-1demo key.lab_headersandlab_aattake a directory ofspire-agent api fetch wit -output jsonoutputs as their first argument.- The gate denies a request that carries both
AAT-ChainandAgent-Delegation-Chain(chain.ambiguous). The chain context sent to the PDP and the Transaction Token hasprincipalwhen the format names one.
0.2.0 - 2026-11-19
Section titled “0.2.0 - 2026-11-19”Adds AAT delegation-chain verification to the gate, the lab, tracing and the project site. Breaking: [aat] must set required, and the gate denies AAT requests that are not one tool call or a plain body-less request.
- The gate verifies an AAT chain sent in
AAT-ChainandAAT-PoP(seedocs/bindings.md), reads the tool and arguments from an MCPtools/callbody, requires the chain’s holder to be the WIT key when a WIT is present, and passes the chain to the PDP and into the Transaction Tokentctx. Configured with[aat]in the server file. deploy/lab: Envoy, visado, OPA with the AuthZEN plugin and an echo upstream in Docker Compose, with thirteen scenarios indemo.shthat CI runs.- A Dockerfile for the server.
- OpenTelemetry: one
visado.authorizespan per decision withvisado.*attributes, exported over OTLP when[telemetry] otlp_endpointis set. The lab sends them to Jaeger. scripts/check.shruns every CI check locally.visado-chain: the format-neutral delegation chain model (NormalizedChain,Hop, signer binding, link, assurance) and theChainDecodertrait.visado-chain-aat: Attenuating Agent Token verification per draft-niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens-02, §8 steps 1 to 7, with errors that name the failing step.- The 229 published AAT JWS vectors in
conformance/aat/, from tenuo-ai/tenuo (Apache-2.0), all passing. A rootNOTICEfile records the attribution. - cargo-fuzz targets in
fuzz/for Transaction Token verification and token requests, AAT chain verification and decoding, AuthZEN responses and caller authentication, seeded from the conformance vectors. CI runs each for 30 seconds. - The Dockerfile pins its base images by digest, and Dependabot keeps the digests current.
Changed
Section titled “Changed”visado-chain:NormalizedChainhasholder_proof.ChainDecoder::decodesets it tofalse;visado-chain-aat’sVerifier::verifysets it totrueafter the PoP check.
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A chain verified on a forwarded Transaction Token is recorded in a replacement token (
tctx.chain:<caller>) instead of being dropped. -
The gate accepts only two request forms with an AAT chain (one
tools/call, or a body-less GET/HEAD/DELETE/OPTIONS without a query string) and denies the rest.[aat] required = truedenies requests that carry no chain. -
The gate no longer treats a request that is not one MCP tool call as the path tool: batches, non-JSON bodies, malformed
tools/calland missing bodies are denied. -
A bearer-only caller can no longer present an AAT chain; only a WIT caller whose key is the chain’s holder can.
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The server requires
audon the chain andaat_audon the proof by default. -
visado-chain-aat: the PoP JWT signature (steps 7a and 7b) is checked before the arguments are matched against the constraints (6b), as §8 recommends. Constraint value sets are built once when the token is parsed, each argument’s JCS form is computed once, and a token may carry at mostLimits::max_constraint_nodes(default 1024) constraint nodes. A request with a wideanyand large arguments no longer costs tens of milliseconds before the sender is authenticated. -
visado-chain-aat: duplicate JSON member detection is linear, so a header with thousands of members no longer costs time before the signature check. -
visado-chain-aat: JCS number serialization breaks ties between equally short digit strings to even, as RFC 8785 requires (905750064395076.25is905750064395076.2). Digits come from theryucrate. Before, some numbers were judged admissible or not the wrong way round. -
visado-chain-aat: with two trust anchors that share a key under different issuers, the root is matched to the anchor whose issuer equalsiss, not to the first anchor whose key verifies. -
visado-chain-aat:decode()rejects anaudthat is not a string or an array of strings instead of reading it as unrestricted.
0.1.0 - 2026-11-19
Section titled “0.1.0 - 2026-11-19”First release. Pre-alpha: delegation-chain verification is not implemented yet.
visado-txn-token: mint, verify and replace OAuth Transaction Tokens (draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11), and parse token requests. Errors have stable codes.- Transaction Token conformance vectors in
conformance/txn-token/(5 valid, 22 negative). visado-authzen: AuthZEN 1.0 access evaluation client that fails closed, with an agent-for-principal request profile and metadata discovery.visado-credentials: caller authentication with a WIT and a WPT (optionally binding a user access token throughoth), or an OAuth access token alone. WPTjtireplay is checked in memory.visado-extauthz: the decision pipeline and an Envoy ext_authz v3 gRPC service. It mints a Transaction Token, forwards one only from configured internal callers, and removes inbound credentials before the request goes upstream.visadobinary: TOML configuration, ext_authz over gRPC,/healthzand/.well-known/jwks.jsonover HTTP, JSON audit events. Both listeners bind to loopback by default, and the server exits if either fails.- Requests for authorities outside
allowed_authoritiesand paths an upstream could resolve differently (dot segments, encoded dots or slashes, empty segments) are denied before authentication. - OAuth issuers can carry a
subject_prefix; with more than one issuer, every issuer needs one. - Sender-constrained access tokens (
cnf) are rejected until DPoP and mTLS binding exist.scpis read whenscopeis absent, andnbfis checked.
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