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Delegation-chain formats for visado (research, 2026-11-18)

The WG-adopted work does not cover offline attenuation. WIMSE AIMS (draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01, WG doc), OAuth Transaction Tokens, identity chaining (RFC-to-be 10092) and the actor profile record who acted. The 19 Nov joint WIMSE+OAuth session has “Transaction Tokens for Agents” and “OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation”. Under RFC 8693 these carry inner actors as audit history, not as limits on authority.

The offline-attenuated family (par_hash chains: niyikiza AAT-02 in OAuth, asor-03 in WIMSE) is where implementers are working: vectors, independent verifiers, a 16 Nov side meeting and an 18 Nov convergence report. It has no WG adoption.

Recommendation: build the core around the par_hash JWS chain family.

  1. AAT-02 first, as the conformance target: 229 mutation-checked vectors, 2 independent full passes, and per-hop signing by the parent’s cnf key.
  2. asor-03 as a second profile on the same decoder: 36 vectors, all matched by an independent asor verifier written during an earlier hands-on lab, which can serve as an oracle.
  3. An RFC 8693 act adapter at “declared” assurance, which Txn-Token minting needs anyway.
  4. Delegate SD-JWT later (WG doc, but -00 and no vectors).

Confidence: medium. I read only the Nov 5-18 pages of the mail archive, not October. The IETF 127 WIMSE/OAuth sessions run 18-20 Nov, so there are no minutes yet.

Draft (rev, date) Token format Attenuation Chain verification Trust anchor PoP Maturity Impls / vectors
asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03 (2026-10-27) RFC 9068 JWT, JCS-canonical, Ed25519 required; one RAR agent_delegation detail; sub=principal (invariant), client_id=actor, del_depth/del_max_depth, par_hash=SHA-256(parent JWS Signing Input) Scopes (literal / segment wildcard / opaque) + 8 constraint types (max, min, max_lifetime, max_subtree, one_of, not_one_of, prefix, rank); child = meet(parent, request); unknown types fail closed 8 ordered steps, deny on first failure, named outcomes (Table 2); steps 1-5 run offline without a request Root key only; DT_i (i>0) signer unspecified (single-signer model); provenance listed as an open issue (S6.4) cnf + DPoP only (mTLS dropped in -03) Individual draft. The WIMSE drafts hulea, sweeney and nandakumar build on it attenu-guard (Py 0.22.0), attenu-guard-ts 0.16.0 (no step 6/7); Cred native verifier 36/36; 36 -03 + 20 -01 JSON vectors (HS256 test signer)
nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00 (2026-11-16) Extends asor DTs: del_bind=delegator, sub_kind=pseudonym, ctx (dialog/txn) Adds aud subset per hop Child signed by the key in the parent’s cnf; iss=parent client_id; repeated client_id rejected (cycle check); par_hash Root issuer; HMAC pseudonym key Inherits asor -00, 2 days old; Marc Miro wants this as a flag in asor None
niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens-02 (2026-10-26) JWS JWT typ=aat+jwt, Ed25519; RAR attenuating_agent_token with tools -> argument constraints; same par_hash/del_* names Full per-type subsumption table (S4.5), invariants I1-I6; holder derives children offline S8 algorithm; child iss = JWK thumbprint URI of the parent cnf.jwk, signed by that key Root issuer (token endpoint, req_cnf) Leaf aat-pop+jwt binds the tool call and its arguments (an MBA profile uses DPoP/cnf.jkt) Individual; side meeting at IETF 127; asor deferred claim registration to it 229 JSON vectors (tenuo tests/vectors/aat-jws-vectors.json); full passes: mission-core (TS) 229/229, azat aat (TS) 229/229 same step; Tenuo (Rust, CBOR, JWS in progress), Warden (Go, -01), ARCP (Go)
sweeney-wimse-credential-delegation-02 (2026-10-30) DPoP-bound JWTs minted by a Delegation Server; RAR cred_delegation; act.sub, prf -> DS-signed receipt Same 8 constraint types; DS checks containment Online: the DS re-verifies the whole chain at every hop; S5.5 verifies asor tokens offline DS (central; risk noted in S10.9); did:key agents DPoP Individual Cred SDK (TS)
hulea-wimse-agent-mandate-01 (2026-11-01) mandate+jwt + authority+jwt/authority+sd-jwt (evidence that the delegator may delegate) Per-permission narrowing; sum_max, window, cosign_above (no asor equivalent) Deterministic, collects all errors; valid / invalid / indeterminate; child signed by the parent cnf.jkt Role-scoped Trust Anchor Set + trust frameworks HTTP Message Signatures with the WIT key at token exchange Individual; plans to carry the chain in asor format next rev 49 prose conformance cases; some signed vectors external
sato-soos-mjwt-06 (2026-09-07) EdDSA JWT; many SOOS claims; delegation_chain array 8-dimension Narrowing Property, Cedar actions 13 steps; live re-check of the parent signature/status Deferred to WIMSE cnf (presentation undefined) Individual, domain-specific; presented at IETF 126 None found
ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00 (2026-10-26) SD-JWT whose KB-JWT is itself a KB-SD-JWT carrying a delegate_payload, nested Holder withholds disclosures (selective disclosure, not a constraint algebra) Each component verified with the previous component’s cnf; sd_hash/issuer_jwt_hash links Issuer key KB-JWT chain OAuth WG document; on the IETF 127 OAuth agenda No vectors or impls; editorial bugs (typ mismatch S5.1.4 vs S6)
RFC 8693 act + mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01 (2026-10-09), mw-oauth-actor-chain-03 (2026-11-01) Nested act in the AS-issued token; actor-chain adds actp/acti/actc + JWS step proofs None. Inner actors are informational only (RFC 8693 S4.1, actor-profile) Trust the issuing AS; actor-chain “Verified” adds a per-step proof + AS acceptance AS Top-level cnf = outermost actor (DPoP/mTLS) Actor profile on the 19 Nov joint session agenda Actor-chain has ES256 vectors
oauth-ai-agents-on-behalf-of-user-02 requested_actor/actor_token n/a n/a AS n/a Expired (2025-08-25) none

Short notes:

  • jackson-wimse-evaluation-05 (2026-10-28): verifier-evaluation rules (inputs, staleness, fail-closed) so that two verifiers reach the same decision. Complementary to the format drafts. Its fail-closed rules fit a status-fetch policy.
  • thaha-wimse-agent-evidence-binding-03 (Nov 2026): aee_evidence claim (evidence service, policy digest, did:web logical id). It says the act chain is “attribution, not authority”. Not a chain format.
  • lee-wimse-local-tool-call-proof-01 (2026-10-12): an external Call Authority issues a single-use proof over the tool name and argument digest for local (stdio MCP) calls. No chain.
  • ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity-04 (2026-10-27): agent identity bootstrapping and a dual (agent+owner) credential. No chain, no token format.
  • reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00 (2026-10-30): tctx.dlg in Txn-Tokens + a WPT dth claim over a Dialog-Context header. Relevant to minting: a Txn-Token can carry the dialog id, and nandakumar ctx type dialog targets the same binding.
  • durga-wimse-ctx-isolation-00 (2026-10-29; -01 announced 11-17): per-call signed taint attestation, self-asserted by the runtime. Orthogonal to chains; at most an optional “context evidence” attachment.
  • WG side: AIMS is a WIMSE WG doc and points to identity chaining, Txn-Tokens and RFC 8693, but defines no multi-hop attenuation. The 19 Nov joint WIMSE/OAuth session covers Identity Chaining (RFC-to-be 10092), Txn Tokens for Agents and the OAuth Actor Profile. Delegate SD-JWT is an OAuth WG doc on the 18 Nov agenda. At IETF 126, AIMS adoption was requested and the chair said a call would follow. PEDIGREE and SOOS MJWT were presented without recorded outcomes.
  • Implementer side: the 18 Nov post “Implementation report: convergence across the offline-attenuated agent-token drafts” says niyikiza and asor are “nearly wire-identical” on par_hash/del_depth. The open points are the meet algorithm and whether signature octets are hashed (asor-03 says Signing Input). The report proposes shared chain-linkage vectors. Also: the AAT side meeting on 16 Nov; the AAT -02 thread, where del_max_depth semantics remain the main disagreement (AAT allows leaf == max and keeps the holder cap); the hackathon thread on agent call-chain scenarios (revocation after delegation, widening, cumulative limits); and the PACE / Actor-Bound Tokens / delegator-bound drafts from Nandakumar and Jennings (Cisco) on 16 Nov.
  • Inference: the likely end state is act/Txn-Token for attribution inside a domain, plus an offline par_hash chain for bounded authority, possibly converging on a single AAT/asor claim set. Nothing is decided.

Three layers:

  1. ChainDecoder (format-specific): parse, canonicalization rules, signature verification, link verification (par_hash / sd_hash / receipt / none), producing a NormalizedChain plus assurance per hop.
  2. Format-neutral invariant engine: principal invariance, monotone exp, depth (with a DepthSemantics enum: AsorStrict = leaf < root max; AatHolderCap = leaf <= the nearest cap), audience subset, cycle detection on ActorId, status, PoP and the action check.
  3. AuthorityAlgebra per RAR detail type (agent_delegation, attenuating_agent_token, …): subsumes(parent, child) and permits(leaf, action, totals). Unknown type -> deny.

Normalized model (Rust sketch):

struct NormalizedChain {
profile: Profile, // AatJws02 | AsorDt03 | DelegateSdJwt00 | Act8693 ...
principal: Principal, // { iss, id, kind: Subject|Pseudonym }
root: TrustRef, // anchor id + key thumbprint used (for audit)
hops: Vec<Hop>, // index 0 = root
raw: Vec<Bytes>, // exact signing inputs, for receipts
}
struct Hop {
depth: u32, max_depth: Option<u32>,
actor: ActorId, // { iss, sub/client_id }
delegator: Option<ActorId>,
signer: KeyThumbprint,
signer_binding: SignerBinding, // RootAnchor | ParentCnf | AuthServer | Unverified
link: Link, // ParHash([u8;32]) | SdHash | Receipt | NestedOnly
authority: Authority, // { detail_type, scopes, constraints, audiences }
validity: Validity, // iat, nbf, exp
cnf: Option<Cnf>, status: Option<StatusRef>, ctx: Option<ContextRef>,
assurance: Assurance, // Verified (crypto-attenuated) | Declared (act-only)
}
struct Constraint { key: String, op: Op, value: Value, measure: PerAction|Cumulative|Subtree }

Rules: authorize only on hops with assurance=Verified. Declared hops (RFC 8693 inner act) go to audit or Txn-Token context, never to subsumption. Report steps_performed/steps_skipped (asor S6.1). Output Txn-Token: sub=principal, act=leaf actor (outermost), tctx=chain digest + dlg if present.

Test vectors:

  • AAT-02: 229 JSON, tenuo-ai/tenuo tests/vectors/aat-jws-vectors.json, compare_results.py, INTEROP table.
  • asor-03: 36 JSON (src/attenu_guard/vectors/draft02, tag v0.22.0) + 20 -01. HS256 test signer. An independent verifier from an earlier hands-on lab matched 36/36 (and 52/52 including the -01 set).
  • hulea-01: 49 prose cases (not machine-readable).
  • mw-actor-chain-03: ES256 vectors (S30, not read).
  • RFC 8037 Ed25519 / RFC 9449 DPoP examples for primitives.
  • Delegate SD-JWT, nandakumar, MJWT, sweeney: none in-draft (Cred SDK reruns asor vectors).
  • Hackathon scenario files (Ben Le) were promised but not seen.