Delegation-chain formats for visado (research, 2026-11-18)
The WG-adopted work does not cover offline attenuation. WIMSE AIMS (draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01, WG doc), OAuth Transaction Tokens, identity chaining (RFC-to-be 10092) and the actor profile record who acted. The 19 Nov joint WIMSE+OAuth session has “Transaction Tokens for Agents” and “OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation”. Under RFC 8693 these carry inner actors as audit history, not as limits on authority.
The offline-attenuated family (par_hash chains: niyikiza AAT-02 in OAuth, asor-03 in WIMSE) is where implementers are working: vectors, independent verifiers, a 16 Nov side meeting and an 18 Nov convergence report. It has no WG adoption.
Recommendation: build the core around the par_hash JWS chain family.
- AAT-02 first, as the conformance target: 229 mutation-checked vectors, 2 independent full passes, and per-hop signing by the parent’s
cnfkey. - asor-03 as a second profile on the same decoder: 36 vectors, all matched by an independent asor verifier written during an earlier hands-on lab, which can serve as an oracle.
- An RFC 8693
actadapter at “declared” assurance, which Txn-Token minting needs anyway. - Delegate SD-JWT later (WG doc, but -00 and no vectors).
Confidence: medium. I read only the Nov 5-18 pages of the mail archive, not October. The IETF 127 WIMSE/OAuth sessions run 18-20 Nov, so there are no minutes yet.
Comparison
Section titled “Comparison”| Draft (rev, date) | Token format | Attenuation | Chain verification | Trust anchor | PoP | Maturity | Impls / vectors |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03 (2026-10-27) | RFC 9068 JWT, JCS-canonical, Ed25519 required; one RAR agent_delegation detail; sub=principal (invariant), client_id=actor, del_depth/del_max_depth, par_hash=SHA-256(parent JWS Signing Input) |
Scopes (literal / segment wildcard / opaque) + 8 constraint types (max, min, max_lifetime, max_subtree, one_of, not_one_of, prefix, rank); child = meet(parent, request); unknown types fail closed | 8 ordered steps, deny on first failure, named outcomes (Table 2); steps 1-5 run offline without a request | Root key only; DT_i (i>0) signer unspecified (single-signer model); provenance listed as an open issue (S6.4) | cnf + DPoP only (mTLS dropped in -03) |
Individual draft. The WIMSE drafts hulea, sweeney and nandakumar build on it | attenu-guard (Py 0.22.0), attenu-guard-ts 0.16.0 (no step 6/7); Cred native verifier 36/36; 36 -03 + 20 -01 JSON vectors (HS256 test signer) |
| nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00 (2026-11-16) | Extends asor DTs: del_bind=delegator, sub_kind=pseudonym, ctx (dialog/txn) |
Adds aud subset per hop |
Child signed by the key in the parent’s cnf; iss=parent client_id; repeated client_id rejected (cycle check); par_hash |
Root issuer; HMAC pseudonym key | Inherits asor | -00, 2 days old; Marc Miro wants this as a flag in asor | None |
| niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens-02 (2026-10-26) | JWS JWT typ=aat+jwt, Ed25519; RAR attenuating_agent_token with tools -> argument constraints; same par_hash/del_* names |
Full per-type subsumption table (S4.5), invariants I1-I6; holder derives children offline | S8 algorithm; child iss = JWK thumbprint URI of the parent cnf.jwk, signed by that key |
Root issuer (token endpoint, req_cnf) |
Leaf aat-pop+jwt binds the tool call and its arguments (an MBA profile uses DPoP/cnf.jkt) |
Individual; side meeting at IETF 127; asor deferred claim registration to it | 229 JSON vectors (tenuo tests/vectors/aat-jws-vectors.json); full passes: mission-core (TS) 229/229, azat aat (TS) 229/229 same step; Tenuo (Rust, CBOR, JWS in progress), Warden (Go, -01), ARCP (Go) |
| sweeney-wimse-credential-delegation-02 (2026-10-30) | DPoP-bound JWTs minted by a Delegation Server; RAR cred_delegation; act.sub, prf -> DS-signed receipt |
Same 8 constraint types; DS checks containment | Online: the DS re-verifies the whole chain at every hop; S5.5 verifies asor tokens offline | DS (central; risk noted in S10.9); did:key agents | DPoP | Individual | Cred SDK (TS) |
| hulea-wimse-agent-mandate-01 (2026-11-01) | mandate+jwt + authority+jwt/authority+sd-jwt (evidence that the delegator may delegate) |
Per-permission narrowing; sum_max, window, cosign_above (no asor equivalent) |
Deterministic, collects all errors; valid / invalid / indeterminate; child signed by the parent cnf.jkt |
Role-scoped Trust Anchor Set + trust frameworks | HTTP Message Signatures with the WIT key at token exchange | Individual; plans to carry the chain in asor format next rev | 49 prose conformance cases; some signed vectors external |
| sato-soos-mjwt-06 (2026-09-07) | EdDSA JWT; many SOOS claims; delegation_chain array |
8-dimension Narrowing Property, Cedar actions | 13 steps; live re-check of the parent signature/status | Deferred to WIMSE | cnf (presentation undefined) |
Individual, domain-specific; presented at IETF 126 | None found |
| ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00 (2026-10-26) | SD-JWT whose KB-JWT is itself a KB-SD-JWT carrying a delegate_payload, nested |
Holder withholds disclosures (selective disclosure, not a constraint algebra) | Each component verified with the previous component’s cnf; sd_hash/issuer_jwt_hash links |
Issuer key | KB-JWT chain | OAuth WG document; on the IETF 127 OAuth agenda | No vectors or impls; editorial bugs (typ mismatch S5.1.4 vs S6) |
RFC 8693 act + mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01 (2026-10-09), mw-oauth-actor-chain-03 (2026-11-01) |
Nested act in the AS-issued token; actor-chain adds actp/acti/actc + JWS step proofs |
None. Inner actors are informational only (RFC 8693 S4.1, actor-profile) | Trust the issuing AS; actor-chain “Verified” adds a per-step proof + AS acceptance | AS | Top-level cnf = outermost actor (DPoP/mTLS) |
Actor profile on the 19 Nov joint session agenda | Actor-chain has ES256 vectors |
| oauth-ai-agents-on-behalf-of-user-02 | requested_actor/actor_token |
n/a | n/a | AS | n/a | Expired (2025-08-25) | none |
Short notes:
- jackson-wimse-evaluation-05 (2026-10-28): verifier-evaluation rules (inputs, staleness, fail-closed) so that two verifiers reach the same decision. Complementary to the format drafts. Its fail-closed rules fit a status-fetch policy.
- thaha-wimse-agent-evidence-binding-03 (Nov 2026):
aee_evidenceclaim (evidence service, policy digest, did:web logical id). It says theactchain is “attribution, not authority”. Not a chain format. - lee-wimse-local-tool-call-proof-01 (2026-10-12): an external Call Authority issues a single-use proof over the tool name and argument digest for local (stdio MCP) calls. No chain.
- ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity-04 (2026-10-27): agent identity bootstrapping and a dual (agent+owner) credential. No chain, no token format.
- reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00 (2026-10-30):
tctx.dlgin Txn-Tokens + a WPTdthclaim over a Dialog-Context header. Relevant to minting: a Txn-Token can carry the dialog id, and nandakumarctxtypedialogtargets the same binding. - durga-wimse-ctx-isolation-00 (2026-10-29; -01 announced 11-17): per-call signed taint attestation, self-asserted by the runtime. Orthogonal to chains; at most an optional “context evidence” attachment.
Momentum (Oct-Nov 2026)
Section titled “Momentum (Oct-Nov 2026)”- WG side: AIMS is a WIMSE WG doc and points to identity chaining, Txn-Tokens and RFC 8693, but defines no multi-hop attenuation. The 19 Nov joint WIMSE/OAuth session covers Identity Chaining (RFC-to-be 10092), Txn Tokens for Agents and the OAuth Actor Profile. Delegate SD-JWT is an OAuth WG doc on the 18 Nov agenda. At IETF 126, AIMS adoption was requested and the chair said a call would follow. PEDIGREE and SOOS MJWT were presented without recorded outcomes.
- Implementer side: the 18 Nov post “Implementation report: convergence across the offline-attenuated agent-token drafts” says niyikiza and asor are “nearly wire-identical” on
par_hash/del_depth. The open points are the meet algorithm and whether signature octets are hashed (asor-03 says Signing Input). The report proposes shared chain-linkage vectors. Also: the AAT side meeting on 16 Nov; the AAT -02 thread, wheredel_max_depthsemantics remain the main disagreement (AAT allows leaf == max and keeps the holder cap); the hackathon thread on agent call-chain scenarios (revocation after delegation, widening, cumulative limits); and the PACE / Actor-Bound Tokens / delegator-bound drafts from Nandakumar and Jennings (Cisco) on 16 Nov. - Inference: the likely end state is
act/Txn-Token for attribution inside a domain, plus an offlinepar_hashchain for bounded authority, possibly converging on a single AAT/asor claim set. Nothing is decided.
Recommendation: pluggable chain verifier
Section titled “Recommendation: pluggable chain verifier”Three layers:
ChainDecoder(format-specific): parse, canonicalization rules, signature verification, link verification (par_hash/sd_hash/ receipt / none), producing aNormalizedChainplusassuranceper hop.- Format-neutral invariant engine: principal invariance, monotone
exp, depth (with aDepthSemanticsenum:AsorStrict= leaf < root max;AatHolderCap= leaf <= the nearest cap), audience subset, cycle detection onActorId, status, PoP and the action check. AuthorityAlgebraper RAR detail type (agent_delegation,attenuating_agent_token, …):subsumes(parent, child)andpermits(leaf, action, totals). Unknown type -> deny.
Normalized model (Rust sketch):
struct NormalizedChain { profile: Profile, // AatJws02 | AsorDt03 | DelegateSdJwt00 | Act8693 ... principal: Principal, // { iss, id, kind: Subject|Pseudonym } root: TrustRef, // anchor id + key thumbprint used (for audit) hops: Vec<Hop>, // index 0 = root raw: Vec<Bytes>, // exact signing inputs, for receipts}struct Hop { depth: u32, max_depth: Option<u32>, actor: ActorId, // { iss, sub/client_id } delegator: Option<ActorId>, signer: KeyThumbprint, signer_binding: SignerBinding, // RootAnchor | ParentCnf | AuthServer | Unverified link: Link, // ParHash([u8;32]) | SdHash | Receipt | NestedOnly authority: Authority, // { detail_type, scopes, constraints, audiences } validity: Validity, // iat, nbf, exp cnf: Option<Cnf>, status: Option<StatusRef>, ctx: Option<ContextRef>, assurance: Assurance, // Verified (crypto-attenuated) | Declared (act-only)}struct Constraint { key: String, op: Op, value: Value, measure: PerAction|Cumulative|Subtree }Rules: authorize only on hops with assurance=Verified. Declared hops (RFC 8693 inner act) go to audit or Txn-Token context, never to subsumption. Report steps_performed/steps_skipped (asor S6.1). Output Txn-Token: sub=principal, act=leaf actor (outermost), tctx=chain digest + dlg if present.
Test vectors:
- AAT-02: 229 JSON, tenuo-ai/tenuo
tests/vectors/aat-jws-vectors.json,compare_results.py, INTEROP table. - asor-03: 36 JSON (
src/attenu_guard/vectors/draft02, tag v0.22.0) + 20 -01. HS256 test signer. An independent verifier from an earlier hands-on lab matched 36/36 (and 52/52 including the -01 set). - hulea-01: 49 prose cases (not machine-readable).
- mw-actor-chain-03: ES256 vectors (S30, not read).
- RFC 8037 Ed25519 / RFC 9449 DPoP examples for primitives.
- Delegate SD-JWT, nandakumar, MJWT, sweeney: none in-draft (Cred SDK reruns asor vectors).
- Hackathon scenario files (Ben Le) were promised but not seen.
Sources
Section titled “Sources”- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain/03/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains/00/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens/02/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sweeney-wimse-credential-delegation/02/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hulea-wimse-agent-mandate/01/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sato-soos-mjwt/06/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt/00/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile/01/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain/03/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-oauth-ai-agents-on-behalf-of-user/02/
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693#section-4.1
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jackson-wimse-evaluation/05/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-thaha-wimse-agent-evidence-binding/03/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lee-wimse-local-tool-call-proof/01/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity/04/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding/00/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-wimse-aims/01/
- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/wimse/cassf4o4SK4TEW2KH1g22P-vVEM/ (convergence report, 11-18)
- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/wimse/fMPFKSpMHoji68UYn5W3bcNh_NE/ (delegator-bound reply, 11-16)
- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/wimse/a1elD5SHAy4Yhdf4GkQ4zkrIa78/ (AAT -02 thread, 11-09)
- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/wimse/KhTvcCX802aq2nWC2d1fB7kU4Mg/ (AAT side meeting)
- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/wimse/ZixXiR4EY4j_6MbCONxf7N53qzI/ (hackathon scenarios)
- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/wimse/SHso1Zyz_O4N_fiIhRoh_i8IgZA/ (AIMS-00 multi-hop)
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/125/session/wimse
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-126-wimse-202607201200/
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/127/session/wimse
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/127/session/oauth
- https://github.com/tenuo-ai/tenuo/tree/main/ietf/vectors (README.md, INTEROP.md)
- https://github.com/attenu-io/attenu-guard (src/attenu_guard/vectors/draft02, 36 files)
- Local: tracks/ietf-wimse/deep-dives/draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain/{README,spec-notes,context,interop-checklist,hands-on-log}.md; draft-durga-wimse-ctx-isolation/{README,context}.md
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