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Spec map

Pinned revisions and where the code departs from them. Checked 2026-11-20.

Spec Revision Crate Status
draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens -11 visado-txn-token Mint, verify, replace, request parsing
draft-ietf-wimse-aims -01 (design) Reference composition, not yet implemented
draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant -06 (planned)
draft-niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens -02 visado-chain-aat §8 chain and PoP verification; 229/229 published vectors. Enforced by the gate (docs/bindings.md)
draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain -03 visado-chain-asor §6 steps 1 to 6 and 8; 36/36 published vectors. Enforced by the gate (docs/bindings.md)
RFC 8693 OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC visado-chain-act §4.1 act claim of an access token read as a chain; 20 own vectors (two from the RFC’s figures). Enforced by the gate (docs/bindings.md). No token endpoint, no may_act
RFC 9449 (DPoP) RFC visado-chain (dpop), visado-credentials Proof checks of §4.3 and the §7.1 resource server rules for DPoP-bound access tokens; also the asor leaf proof. No server nonces (§8, §9)
OpenID AuthZEN Authorization API 1.0 Final visado-authzen Single evaluation and metadata discovery

WIMSE credentials (WIT, WPT, HTTP signatures per draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08, mTLS per draft-ietf-wimse-mutual-tls) come from wimsey 0.10.1, which keeps its own spec map. JWT-SVIDs follow the SPIFFE JWT-SVID and trust bundle specifications.

Transaction Tokens: known divergences and choices

Section titled “Transaction Tokens: known divergences and choices”
Topic Draft visado
Scope comparison Not defined (§13.6) Space-separated values compared as a set; narrower means subset
Call chain across replacement MUST be preserved, method out of scope (§13.15) tctx members carry over and cannot change; callers add chain data as new members
Lifetime extension on replacement MAY, SHOULD limit (§13.15) Caller passes max_exp to cap it
Missing REQUIRED claim Not specified as an error class Reported as txn.malformed (the claim set does not parse)
req_wl with several workloads Ambiguous (§9.2) Opaque string, replaced on each replacement
Signature algorithms Not restricted Ed25519, EdDSA, ES256 only
Subject token type for a WIT No URN defined Not handled in this crate; the service decides

No divergences: all 229 vectors in conformance/aat give the expected verdict, and every denial fails at the expected §8 step.

Topic Draft visado
Algorithms Ed25519 required, others MAY (§9.11) Ed25519 and ES256. EdDSA is rejected
crit Reject parameters not understood (§3.5) No extension parameter is understood, so any crit is rejected
kid MAY select among trust anchors If an anchor has that kid, only those anchors are tried; otherwise every anchor whose key fits alg. Of the anchors whose key verifies the signature, the one whose issuer equals iss is used
Step order Steps 6 and 7 may be reordered; PoP signature SHOULD come before 6b PoP size, header and signature (7a, 7b) run before 6b and 6c, so an unsigned request costs no constraint matching. 7c to 7i run after 6c. No vector changes its reported step
Constraint nodes per token Not limited beyond MAX_CONSTRAINT_DEPTH At most max_constraint_nodes (default 1024) across all tools of one token; more fails 3n or 4o
Argument and PoP size Not limited Each at most max_token_size
PoP jti tracking Required for tools with side effects (§7.3) The caller passes a ReplayCache for those tools. The in-memory cache refuses new proofs when full
Root iss is a URI Required (step 3k) A scheme, a colon, and no whitespace or control characters
JSON nesting Not limited beyond MAX_CONSTRAINT_DEPTH At most 256 levels; deeper payloads fail at signature-step parsing (3b, 4b, 7b)
Principal AAT has no sub Principal::Unspecified in the normalized chain
HTTP and MCP binding Out of scope (§1) AAT-Chain and AAT-PoP headers; tool and arguments from a JSON-RPC tools/call body (see docs/bindings.md)
Requests that are not one tool call Not defined Only two forms are accepted: a JSON-RPC tools/call object, and a GET, HEAD, DELETE or OPTIONS request with no body and no query string (tool <METHOD> <path>, arguments {}). Everything else is denied (chain.bad_invocation): batches, other JSON-RPC methods, non-JSON or unreadable bodies, malformed tools/call, query strings, and a missing body on POST, PUT or PATCH
Requests without a chain Not defined [aat] must set required explicitly; with false, a request without AAT-Chain skips the chain checks and the server warns at startup
Chain and Txn-Token scope Not defined The chain gates the call (tool and arguments); the minted scope is not narrowed by it. The chain is carried as tctx.chain on a minted token, or tctx.chain:<caller> on a replacement of a forwarded token
Who may present a chain Holder proves possession with the PoP Only a WIT caller, and the leaf cnf must be the WIT key; bearer-only callers are denied (chain.unbound_caller)
Audience (§9.5) aud and aat_aud optional The server requires both by default (require_chain_aud, require_pop_aud), so a chain cannot be replayed at another enforcement point
PoP replay Shared state across replicas (§7.3) In-memory cache of 100 000 entries per process
aud type Checked at step 6c Checked right after step 5 and reported as 6c, so decode() also rejects an aud that is not a string or an array of strings
decode() Not defined Steps 1 to 5 and the aud type check. No PoP, so the chain has holder_proof: false

No divergences on the vectors: all 36 in conformance/asor give the expected verdict and the expected Table 2 outcome. The rows below are where visado chose, or where it differs from the reference implementation (attenu-guard 0.22.0) on inputs no vector covers.

Topic Draft visado
Signer of DT_i, i > 0 Unspecified; single-signer model (§6.4) Every token must verify under the anchor that signed DT_0 (SignerBinding::RootAnchor on every hop); a child signed by another trusted anchor is denied
Algorithms Ed25519 required, ES256 MAY; fully specified (§3, step 1) Ed25519 and ES256, taken from the anchor key’s type. EdDSA is not accepted. HS256 exists only for the vectors, through TrustAnchor::hs256; the server cannot configure it
typ and crit at+jwt (RFC 9068) typ must be at+jwt or application/at+jwt, and any crit is rejected, both as malformed. attenu-guard checks neither
cnf Carries the JWK thumbprint, proven with DPoP (§7) cnf.jkt is required. attenu-guard also accepts jwk or x5t#S256 at parse; neither can be used with DPoP step 6
iat, exp, nbf NumericDate Integers only; a fraction is malformed
Missing par_hash on a child; del_depth or the root del_max_depth missing or of the wrong shape Required claims (§3) malformed at parse. attenu-guard names these par_hash_mismatch (step 2) and depth_invalid (step 3)
A par_hash of the wrong length Step 2 par_hash_mismatch; one that is not base64url is malformed
NaN or Infinity literals non_finite Not JSON, so malformed. A number that overflows a double, such as 1e400, is non_finite
A child’s del_max_depth Rule 5 only; step 3 checks the root’s (§6) Checked for rule 5 against the nearest ancestor that carries one, and not used as a depth cap. Hop::max_depth is the root’s del_max_depth - 1 on every hop
Step 7, status lists Deny when status cannot be established Not implemented: a token with a status claim is denied as status_unknown. A token without one is not checked
Cumulative constraints Checked where the running total is held (step 8) The library takes a RunningTotals source; the gate holds none, so a leaf with max_lifetime or max_subtree denies every call (ceiling_exceeded)
Per-action constraint with no matching parameter Not defined Denied (ceiling_exceeded), so an upstream default for an omitted argument cannot pass a ceiling. attenu-guard leaves it unbounded. A parameter of the wrong type is also ceiling_exceeded
Step 8 order Audience, then the action against the leaf authority Audience, scope, then each constraint in the token’s order; the first failure is reported (attenu-guard collects every failing constraint)
DPoP proof RFC 9449 typ dpop+jwt, Ed25519 or ES256 with a public jwk whose thumbprint is the leaf cnf.jkt; htm and htu (without query or fragment, normalized as in the DPoP section below) match the request; iat within 60 s; ath required, over the leaf token; jti at most 256 bytes and accepted once per process. Server nonces are not supported
Size bounds Not defined At most 32 tokens, 64 KiB per token, 256 KiB per chain, 8 KiB per proof and 64 KiB of action parameters, checked before decoding
check() and decode() Steps 1 to 5 without a request (§6.1) decode() runs the parse rules and steps 1 to 5; check() adds the leaf audience, which is what the vectors test. Both return holder_proof: false
HTTP binding Not defined Agent-Delegation-Chain and DPoP headers; the format is chosen by the header, not by typ. The MCP tool name is the action’s scope and its arguments the parameters (see docs/bindings.md)
Who may present a chain The DPoP key holder Only a WIT caller, and the leaf cnf.jkt must be the WIT key; bearer-only callers are denied (chain.unbound_caller)
Principal and a forwarded Txn-Token Not defined The chain’s sub must be the forwarded Transaction Token’s sub (chain.principal_mismatch)
-01 vectors Do not conform to -03 Not run: every one lacks cnf and client_id

RFC 8693 publishes no test vectors. conformance/act has visado’s own 20 cases, two of them the claim sets of the RFC’s Figures 5 and 6.

Topic RFC 8693 visado
Current and prior actors The outermost act is the current actor; nested ones are prior actors, the most deeply nested the least recent (§4.1) Hops run from the least recent actor to the current one; the current actor is the leaf
Access control Consider only the top-level claims and the current actor; prior actors “are not to be considered in access control decisions” (§4.1) The PDP gets the current actor only. Prior actors and the depth go to the Transaction Token tctx and are never compared with anything. The current actor’s hop is Verified; prior actors are Declared
Who the current actor is Not defined for a resource server The current actor’s sub must equal the authenticated caller’s identifier, or the caller [act.actors] maps it to; otherwise act.actor_mismatch
Who may present a chain Not defined Only a caller that proved possession of a key for the request, as for AAT and asor; a bearer token with act is denied (chain.unbound_caller)
Actor identity act claims identify the actor; iss with sub may be needed (§4.1) sub is required and a non-empty string (act.missing_sub); iss, when present, a non-empty string (act.bad_issuer). The actor is named by its iss, or the token’s issuer without one. Binding compares sub only: the token’s issuer vouches for the whole claim
Non-identity claims in act Not meaningful and not used (§4.1) Ignored
Shape of act A JSON object Anything else, outermost or nested (including null), is act.not_object
Nesting depth Not limited At most max_actors actors (default 8, at most 32); more is act.too_deep
Authority per actor Not defined None is invented: the token’s scope is what the call may use, and the chain narrows nothing
Token without [act] A token with an act claim is denied (chain.unsupported), not read as the subject’s own token
act next to another chain chain.ambiguous with AAT-Chain or Agent-Delegation-Chain
Principal and a forwarded Txn-Token The token’s sub must be the forwarded Transaction Token’s sub (chain.principal_mismatch)
may_act (§4.4) Who may become the actor Not read
Token exchange endpoint (§2) Defined Not implemented
Topic Spec visado
Agent acting for a user Not defined subject is the agent (type: agent); the user is context.principal
X-Request-ID echo PDP MUST echo it A different echo is an error; a missing echo is tolerated
Non-boolean decision Must be boolean Treated as an error, so the request is denied
Batch and search APIs Defined Not used
Topic Draft visado
User token next to a WPT Bound through oth Read from x-user-token (configurable) and used only when oth binds it
WPT replay jti In-memory cache per process; when full, new proofs are rejected
Key selection Not specified The unverified sub trust domain and kid select a configured key; the signature is then checked
Proof jti length Not limited At most 256 bytes
Method selection One method per request Fixed order by headers (docs/bindings.md); a WIT with both Authorization and Signature-Input is a WPT if the scheme is WPT, otherwise denied
HTTP signature audience wimse-aud against the recipient’s configured audiences Compared with the request’s scheme, authority and path, like WPT aud; the authority must be in allowed_authorities, which visado refuses to start without
HTTP signature window Tight expires (minutes) expires minus created at most max_signature_lifetime (default 60 s, at most 300); the age of created at most that plus the clock leeway
HTTP signature nonce Replay defense is the recipient’s Recorded per workload until expires in the WPT replay cache; at most 256 bytes
HTTP signature body Content-Digest covered when present The digest is recomputed over the body Envoy sends (with_request_body); sha-256 only; a missing body counts as empty and a partial body is denied; unless the request has exactly one Content-Length: 0, a body is assumed and content-digest must be covered
HTTP signature failures 400, one problem type, no detail httpsig.invalid, 400, application/problem+json; the detail goes to the audit record only
User token with an HTTP signature Not defined Read from x-user-token (configurable) and used only when the signature covers it; Authorization next to a signature is denied
mTLS certificate source The TLS peer Envoy’s source.certificate; Envoy must terminate TLS and be the only client of the gRPC port, which the server enforces by requiring a loopback grpc_listen unless grpc_reachable_only_by_proxy is set
mTLS path validation RFC 5280 path validation and revocation One CA per trust domain that signs the leaf directly; no intermediates, name constraints or revocation. The leaf must not be a CA and its key usage, if present, must allow signatures only
mTLS with credential headers Not defined A WIT or Authorization header takes precedence; the certificate authenticates only a request with neither
Proof key for AAT chains Not defined The WIT cnf key (WPT and HTTP signature) or the certificate key (mTLS, Ed25519 or P-256); bearer methods have none and cannot present a chain
Topic Spec visado
Algorithms RS256 to PS512, ES256 to ES512 RS256 and ES256 only
typ JWT or JOSE if present Same
aud Required, validated Required; one of [jwt_svid] audiences, exact match
kid Optional Selects the bundle key; without it only a bundle with one key works. Bundle keys must have kid
Bundle SPIFFE trust bundle, keys with use Read from a file per trust domain; only use: jwt-svid keys; no refresh
Telling it from an OAuth token Not defined sub is a SPIFFE ID and iss is not a configured OAuth issuer
Holder binding Bearer No proof key: no AAT chain, no Txn-Token forwarding, no user token
Topic Spec visado
Sender-constrained tokens (cnf) RFC 9449, RFC 8705 cnf with only a jkt string is a DPoP-bound token (below). Any other cnf, including x5t#S256 (RFC 8705), is rejected (token.sender_constrained)
scope vs scp RFC 9068 uses scope scp (string or array) is read when scope is absent
No scope in a user token Txn-Tokens §13.14 Denied (token.no_scope); the default scope applies only to a workload without a user token
Several issuers Each needs a subject_prefix, so sub and client_id cannot collide
typ RFC 9068 at+jwt Not checked
Topic RFC 9449 visado
Request Authorization: DPoP <token> and one DPoP header (§7.1) Same. No DPoP header, two of them, or a value with a comma (a proxy-joined pair) is dpop.invalid
typ, alg, jwk (§4.3 items 4 to 7) dpop+jwt, asymmetric, public key only ES256, EdDSA or Ed25519 with a matching P-256 or Ed25519 JWK; private or symmetric members, crit, and every other alg are refused
htm, htu (items 8, 9) Method; URI without query and fragment, normalized per RFC 3986 §6.2.2 and §6.2.3 htu and scheme://authority/path of the request, each with scheme and host lowercased, the default port dropped and an empty path made /. Percent-encodings are compared as sent
iat (item 11) Within an acceptable window Within dpop_iat_window (default 60 s, at most 300 s) either side of now
jti (§11.1) Not reused within the window At most 256 bytes; recorded per proof key in the same bounded in-memory replay cache as WPT jti values, until iat plus the window. Not shared across replicas
ath (item 12) Required with an access token Required; base64url SHA-256 of the token as sent
Key binding (§6, §7.1) cnf.jkt equals the proof key’s RFC 7638 thumbprint Same. A token without cnf.jkt, or a proof by another key, is dpop.binding (invalid_token)
Downgrade (§7.1) A bound token must not be accepted as a bearer token Denied as Bearer and as a user token next to a WPT or signature (token.dpop_bound)
Challenge (§7.1) WWW-Authenticate: DPoP with error and algs DPoP error="invalid_dpop_proof" for proof failures and replay, error="invalid_token" for token and binding failures; other access token failures send Bearer, DPoP algs="ES256 EdDSA Ed25519"
Server nonces (§8), authorization server side (§5, §10) Optional Not implemented: no DPoP-Nonce, no use_dpop_nonce
Holder key The proof key is the caller’s proof_key, so an AAT chain held by it is accepted. An asor chain is refused (chain.proof_conflict): its leaf proof would need the same DPoP header