Spec map
Pinned revisions and where the code departs from them. Checked 2026-11-20.
Pinned revisions
Section titled “Pinned revisions”| Spec | Revision | Crate | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens | -11 | visado-txn-token |
Mint, verify, replace, request parsing |
| draft-ietf-wimse-aims | -01 | (design) | Reference composition, not yet implemented |
| draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant | -06 | (planned) | |
| draft-niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens | -02 | visado-chain-aat |
§8 chain and PoP verification; 229/229 published vectors. Enforced by the gate (docs/bindings.md) |
| draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain | -03 | visado-chain-asor |
§6 steps 1 to 6 and 8; 36/36 published vectors. Enforced by the gate (docs/bindings.md) |
| RFC 8693 OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange | RFC | visado-chain-act |
§4.1 act claim of an access token read as a chain; 20 own vectors (two from the RFC’s figures). Enforced by the gate (docs/bindings.md). No token endpoint, no may_act |
| RFC 9449 (DPoP) | RFC | visado-chain (dpop), visado-credentials |
Proof checks of §4.3 and the §7.1 resource server rules for DPoP-bound access tokens; also the asor leaf proof. No server nonces (§8, §9) |
| OpenID AuthZEN Authorization API | 1.0 Final | visado-authzen |
Single evaluation and metadata discovery |
WIMSE credentials (WIT, WPT, HTTP signatures per draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08, mTLS per draft-ietf-wimse-mutual-tls) come from wimsey 0.10.1, which keeps its own spec map. JWT-SVIDs follow the SPIFFE JWT-SVID and trust bundle specifications.
Transaction Tokens: known divergences and choices
Section titled “Transaction Tokens: known divergences and choices”| Topic | Draft | visado |
|---|---|---|
| Scope comparison | Not defined (§13.6) | Space-separated values compared as a set; narrower means subset |
| Call chain across replacement | MUST be preserved, method out of scope (§13.15) | tctx members carry over and cannot change; callers add chain data as new members |
| Lifetime extension on replacement | MAY, SHOULD limit (§13.15) | Caller passes max_exp to cap it |
| Missing REQUIRED claim | Not specified as an error class | Reported as txn.malformed (the claim set does not parse) |
req_wl with several workloads |
Ambiguous (§9.2) | Opaque string, replaced on each replacement |
| Signature algorithms | Not restricted | Ed25519, EdDSA, ES256 only |
| Subject token type for a WIT | No URN defined | Not handled in this crate; the service decides |
AAT: known divergences and choices
Section titled “AAT: known divergences and choices”No divergences: all 229 vectors in conformance/aat give the expected verdict, and every denial fails at the expected §8 step.
| Topic | Draft | visado |
|---|---|---|
| Algorithms | Ed25519 required, others MAY (§9.11) | Ed25519 and ES256. EdDSA is rejected |
crit |
Reject parameters not understood (§3.5) | No extension parameter is understood, so any crit is rejected |
kid |
MAY select among trust anchors | If an anchor has that kid, only those anchors are tried; otherwise every anchor whose key fits alg. Of the anchors whose key verifies the signature, the one whose issuer equals iss is used |
| Step order | Steps 6 and 7 may be reordered; PoP signature SHOULD come before 6b | PoP size, header and signature (7a, 7b) run before 6b and 6c, so an unsigned request costs no constraint matching. 7c to 7i run after 6c. No vector changes its reported step |
| Constraint nodes per token | Not limited beyond MAX_CONSTRAINT_DEPTH | At most max_constraint_nodes (default 1024) across all tools of one token; more fails 3n or 4o |
| Argument and PoP size | Not limited | Each at most max_token_size |
PoP jti tracking |
Required for tools with side effects (§7.3) | The caller passes a ReplayCache for those tools. The in-memory cache refuses new proofs when full |
Root iss is a URI |
Required (step 3k) | A scheme, a colon, and no whitespace or control characters |
| JSON nesting | Not limited beyond MAX_CONSTRAINT_DEPTH | At most 256 levels; deeper payloads fail at signature-step parsing (3b, 4b, 7b) |
| Principal | AAT has no sub |
Principal::Unspecified in the normalized chain |
| HTTP and MCP binding | Out of scope (§1) | AAT-Chain and AAT-PoP headers; tool and arguments from a JSON-RPC tools/call body (see docs/bindings.md) |
| Requests that are not one tool call | Not defined | Only two forms are accepted: a JSON-RPC tools/call object, and a GET, HEAD, DELETE or OPTIONS request with no body and no query string (tool <METHOD> <path>, arguments {}). Everything else is denied (chain.bad_invocation): batches, other JSON-RPC methods, non-JSON or unreadable bodies, malformed tools/call, query strings, and a missing body on POST, PUT or PATCH |
| Requests without a chain | Not defined | [aat] must set required explicitly; with false, a request without AAT-Chain skips the chain checks and the server warns at startup |
| Chain and Txn-Token scope | Not defined | The chain gates the call (tool and arguments); the minted scope is not narrowed by it. The chain is carried as tctx.chain on a minted token, or tctx.chain:<caller> on a replacement of a forwarded token |
| Who may present a chain | Holder proves possession with the PoP | Only a WIT caller, and the leaf cnf must be the WIT key; bearer-only callers are denied (chain.unbound_caller) |
| Audience (§9.5) | aud and aat_aud optional |
The server requires both by default (require_chain_aud, require_pop_aud), so a chain cannot be replayed at another enforcement point |
| PoP replay | Shared state across replicas (§7.3) | In-memory cache of 100 000 entries per process |
aud type |
Checked at step 6c | Checked right after step 5 and reported as 6c, so decode() also rejects an aud that is not a string or an array of strings |
decode() |
Not defined | Steps 1 to 5 and the aud type check. No PoP, so the chain has holder_proof: false |
asor: known divergences and choices
Section titled “asor: known divergences and choices”No divergences on the vectors: all 36 in conformance/asor give the expected verdict and the expected Table 2 outcome. The rows below are where visado chose, or where it differs from the reference implementation (attenu-guard 0.22.0) on inputs no vector covers.
| Topic | Draft | visado |
|---|---|---|
Signer of DT_i, i > 0 |
Unspecified; single-signer model (§6.4) | Every token must verify under the anchor that signed DT_0 (SignerBinding::RootAnchor on every hop); a child signed by another trusted anchor is denied |
| Algorithms | Ed25519 required, ES256 MAY; fully specified (§3, step 1) | Ed25519 and ES256, taken from the anchor key’s type. EdDSA is not accepted. HS256 exists only for the vectors, through TrustAnchor::hs256; the server cannot configure it |
typ and crit |
at+jwt (RFC 9068) |
typ must be at+jwt or application/at+jwt, and any crit is rejected, both as malformed. attenu-guard checks neither |
cnf |
Carries the JWK thumbprint, proven with DPoP (§7) | cnf.jkt is required. attenu-guard also accepts jwk or x5t#S256 at parse; neither can be used with DPoP step 6 |
iat, exp, nbf |
NumericDate | Integers only; a fraction is malformed |
Missing par_hash on a child; del_depth or the root del_max_depth missing or of the wrong shape |
Required claims (§3) | malformed at parse. attenu-guard names these par_hash_mismatch (step 2) and depth_invalid (step 3) |
A par_hash of the wrong length |
Step 2 | par_hash_mismatch; one that is not base64url is malformed |
NaN or Infinity literals |
non_finite |
Not JSON, so malformed. A number that overflows a double, such as 1e400, is non_finite |
A child’s del_max_depth |
Rule 5 only; step 3 checks the root’s (§6) | Checked for rule 5 against the nearest ancestor that carries one, and not used as a depth cap. Hop::max_depth is the root’s del_max_depth - 1 on every hop |
| Step 7, status lists | Deny when status cannot be established | Not implemented: a token with a status claim is denied as status_unknown. A token without one is not checked |
| Cumulative constraints | Checked where the running total is held (step 8) | The library takes a RunningTotals source; the gate holds none, so a leaf with max_lifetime or max_subtree denies every call (ceiling_exceeded) |
| Per-action constraint with no matching parameter | Not defined | Denied (ceiling_exceeded), so an upstream default for an omitted argument cannot pass a ceiling. attenu-guard leaves it unbounded. A parameter of the wrong type is also ceiling_exceeded |
| Step 8 order | Audience, then the action against the leaf authority | Audience, scope, then each constraint in the token’s order; the first failure is reported (attenu-guard collects every failing constraint) |
| DPoP proof | RFC 9449 | typ dpop+jwt, Ed25519 or ES256 with a public jwk whose thumbprint is the leaf cnf.jkt; htm and htu (without query or fragment, normalized as in the DPoP section below) match the request; iat within 60 s; ath required, over the leaf token; jti at most 256 bytes and accepted once per process. Server nonces are not supported |
| Size bounds | Not defined | At most 32 tokens, 64 KiB per token, 256 KiB per chain, 8 KiB per proof and 64 KiB of action parameters, checked before decoding |
check() and decode() |
Steps 1 to 5 without a request (§6.1) | decode() runs the parse rules and steps 1 to 5; check() adds the leaf audience, which is what the vectors test. Both return holder_proof: false |
| HTTP binding | Not defined | Agent-Delegation-Chain and DPoP headers; the format is chosen by the header, not by typ. The MCP tool name is the action’s scope and its arguments the parameters (see docs/bindings.md) |
| Who may present a chain | The DPoP key holder | Only a WIT caller, and the leaf cnf.jkt must be the WIT key; bearer-only callers are denied (chain.unbound_caller) |
| Principal and a forwarded Txn-Token | Not defined | The chain’s sub must be the forwarded Transaction Token’s sub (chain.principal_mismatch) |
| -01 vectors | Do not conform to -03 | Not run: every one lacks cnf and client_id |
RFC 8693 act: choices
Section titled “RFC 8693 act: choices”RFC 8693 publishes no test vectors. conformance/act has visado’s own 20 cases, two of them the claim sets of the RFC’s Figures 5 and 6.
| Topic | RFC 8693 | visado |
|---|---|---|
| Current and prior actors | The outermost act is the current actor; nested ones are prior actors, the most deeply nested the least recent (§4.1) |
Hops run from the least recent actor to the current one; the current actor is the leaf |
| Access control | Consider only the top-level claims and the current actor; prior actors “are not to be considered in access control decisions” (§4.1) | The PDP gets the current actor only. Prior actors and the depth go to the Transaction Token tctx and are never compared with anything. The current actor’s hop is Verified; prior actors are Declared |
| Who the current actor is | Not defined for a resource server | The current actor’s sub must equal the authenticated caller’s identifier, or the caller [act.actors] maps it to; otherwise act.actor_mismatch |
| Who may present a chain | Not defined | Only a caller that proved possession of a key for the request, as for AAT and asor; a bearer token with act is denied (chain.unbound_caller) |
| Actor identity | act claims identify the actor; iss with sub may be needed (§4.1) |
sub is required and a non-empty string (act.missing_sub); iss, when present, a non-empty string (act.bad_issuer). The actor is named by its iss, or the token’s issuer without one. Binding compares sub only: the token’s issuer vouches for the whole claim |
Non-identity claims in act |
Not meaningful and not used (§4.1) | Ignored |
Shape of act |
A JSON object | Anything else, outermost or nested (including null), is act.not_object |
| Nesting depth | Not limited | At most max_actors actors (default 8, at most 32); more is act.too_deep |
| Authority per actor | Not defined | None is invented: the token’s scope is what the call may use, and the chain narrows nothing |
Token without [act] |
A token with an act claim is denied (chain.unsupported), not read as the subject’s own token |
|
act next to another chain |
chain.ambiguous with AAT-Chain or Agent-Delegation-Chain |
|
| Principal and a forwarded Txn-Token | The token’s sub must be the forwarded Transaction Token’s sub (chain.principal_mismatch) |
|
may_act (§4.4) |
Who may become the actor | Not read |
| Token exchange endpoint (§2) | Defined | Not implemented |
AuthZEN: choices
Section titled “AuthZEN: choices”| Topic | Spec | visado |
|---|---|---|
| Agent acting for a user | Not defined | subject is the agent (type: agent); the user is context.principal |
X-Request-ID echo |
PDP MUST echo it | A different echo is an error; a missing echo is tolerated |
Non-boolean decision |
Must be boolean | Treated as an error, so the request is denied |
| Batch and search APIs | Defined | Not used |
WIMSE credentials: choices
Section titled “WIMSE credentials: choices”| Topic | Draft | visado |
|---|---|---|
| User token next to a WPT | Bound through oth |
Read from x-user-token (configurable) and used only when oth binds it |
| WPT replay | jti |
In-memory cache per process; when full, new proofs are rejected |
| Key selection | Not specified | The unverified sub trust domain and kid select a configured key; the signature is then checked |
Proof jti length |
Not limited | At most 256 bytes |
| Method selection | One method per request | Fixed order by headers (docs/bindings.md); a WIT with both Authorization and Signature-Input is a WPT if the scheme is WPT, otherwise denied |
| HTTP signature audience | wimse-aud against the recipient’s configured audiences |
Compared with the request’s scheme, authority and path, like WPT aud; the authority must be in allowed_authorities, which visado refuses to start without |
| HTTP signature window | Tight expires (minutes) |
expires minus created at most max_signature_lifetime (default 60 s, at most 300); the age of created at most that plus the clock leeway |
| HTTP signature nonce | Replay defense is the recipient’s | Recorded per workload until expires in the WPT replay cache; at most 256 bytes |
| HTTP signature body | Content-Digest covered when present |
The digest is recomputed over the body Envoy sends (with_request_body); sha-256 only; a missing body counts as empty and a partial body is denied; unless the request has exactly one Content-Length: 0, a body is assumed and content-digest must be covered |
| HTTP signature failures | 400, one problem type, no detail | httpsig.invalid, 400, application/problem+json; the detail goes to the audit record only |
| User token with an HTTP signature | Not defined | Read from x-user-token (configurable) and used only when the signature covers it; Authorization next to a signature is denied |
| mTLS certificate source | The TLS peer | Envoy’s source.certificate; Envoy must terminate TLS and be the only client of the gRPC port, which the server enforces by requiring a loopback grpc_listen unless grpc_reachable_only_by_proxy is set |
| mTLS path validation | RFC 5280 path validation and revocation | One CA per trust domain that signs the leaf directly; no intermediates, name constraints or revocation. The leaf must not be a CA and its key usage, if present, must allow signatures only |
| mTLS with credential headers | Not defined | A WIT or Authorization header takes precedence; the certificate authenticates only a request with neither |
| Proof key for AAT chains | Not defined | The WIT cnf key (WPT and HTTP signature) or the certificate key (mTLS, Ed25519 or P-256); bearer methods have none and cannot present a chain |
SPIFFE JWT-SVID: choices
Section titled “SPIFFE JWT-SVID: choices”| Topic | Spec | visado |
|---|---|---|
| Algorithms | RS256 to PS512, ES256 to ES512 | RS256 and ES256 only |
typ |
JWT or JOSE if present |
Same |
aud |
Required, validated | Required; one of [jwt_svid] audiences, exact match |
kid |
Optional | Selects the bundle key; without it only a bundle with one key works. Bundle keys must have kid |
| Bundle | SPIFFE trust bundle, keys with use |
Read from a file per trust domain; only use: jwt-svid keys; no refresh |
| Telling it from an OAuth token | Not defined | sub is a SPIFFE ID and iss is not a configured OAuth issuer |
| Holder binding | Bearer | No proof key: no AAT chain, no Txn-Token forwarding, no user token |
OAuth access tokens: choices
Section titled “OAuth access tokens: choices”| Topic | Spec | visado |
|---|---|---|
Sender-constrained tokens (cnf) |
RFC 9449, RFC 8705 | cnf with only a jkt string is a DPoP-bound token (below). Any other cnf, including x5t#S256 (RFC 8705), is rejected (token.sender_constrained) |
scope vs scp |
RFC 9068 uses scope |
scp (string or array) is read when scope is absent |
| No scope in a user token | Txn-Tokens §13.14 | Denied (token.no_scope); the default scope applies only to a workload without a user token |
| Several issuers | Each needs a subject_prefix, so sub and client_id cannot collide |
|
typ |
RFC 9068 at+jwt |
Not checked |
DPoP (RFC 9449): choices
Section titled “DPoP (RFC 9449): choices”| Topic | RFC 9449 | visado |
|---|---|---|
| Request | Authorization: DPoP <token> and one DPoP header (§7.1) |
Same. No DPoP header, two of them, or a value with a comma (a proxy-joined pair) is dpop.invalid |
typ, alg, jwk (§4.3 items 4 to 7) |
dpop+jwt, asymmetric, public key only |
ES256, EdDSA or Ed25519 with a matching P-256 or Ed25519 JWK; private or symmetric members, crit, and every other alg are refused |
htm, htu (items 8, 9) |
Method; URI without query and fragment, normalized per RFC 3986 §6.2.2 and §6.2.3 | htu and scheme://authority/path of the request, each with scheme and host lowercased, the default port dropped and an empty path made /. Percent-encodings are compared as sent |
iat (item 11) |
Within an acceptable window | Within dpop_iat_window (default 60 s, at most 300 s) either side of now |
jti (§11.1) |
Not reused within the window | At most 256 bytes; recorded per proof key in the same bounded in-memory replay cache as WPT jti values, until iat plus the window. Not shared across replicas |
ath (item 12) |
Required with an access token | Required; base64url SHA-256 of the token as sent |
| Key binding (§6, §7.1) | cnf.jkt equals the proof key’s RFC 7638 thumbprint |
Same. A token without cnf.jkt, or a proof by another key, is dpop.binding (invalid_token) |
| Downgrade (§7.1) | A bound token must not be accepted as a bearer token | Denied as Bearer and as a user token next to a WPT or signature (token.dpop_bound) |
| Challenge (§7.1) | WWW-Authenticate: DPoP with error and algs |
DPoP error="invalid_dpop_proof" for proof failures and replay, error="invalid_token" for token and binding failures; other access token failures send Bearer, DPoP algs="ES256 EdDSA Ed25519" |
| Server nonces (§8), authorization server side (§5, §10) | Optional | Not implemented: no DPoP-Nonce, no use_dpop_nonce |
| Holder key | The proof key is the caller’s proof_key, so an AAT chain held by it is accepted. An asor chain is refused (chain.proof_conflict): its leaf proof would need the same DPoP header |
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