Spec requirements checklist (as of 2026-11-18)
Target revisions, checked on datatracker: txn-tokens -11 (2026-07-30, awaiting WG write-up), AIMS -01 (2026-11-02, Informational, WG doc), ID-JAG -06 (2026-10-31), identity-chaining -17 (2026-07-19, RFC Ed Queue), AuthZEN Authorization API 1.0 Final (OIDF approval announcement dated 2026-01-12).
For txn-tokens, ID-JAG and chaining, I read the published draft text (-11, -06, -17) and confirmed it matches the latest revision on datatracker.
1. Transaction Tokens (draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11)
Section titled “1. Transaction Tokens (draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11)”JWT format (§9)
Section titled “JWT format (§9)”- Header
typMUST betxntoken+jwt(§9.1).kidSHOULD be present - REQUIRED claims:
iat,aud,exp,txn(RFC 8417 §2.2),sub,scope,req_wl(§9.2)audMUST identify the Trust Domain. Other domains MUST NOT accept the tokensubMUST be unique within the aud domain. It is not tied toiss
- RECOMMENDED claims:
tctx(immutable authorization details) andrctx(environment context, e.g.req_ip,authn,transport)- In -11 the claim is
rctx. There is noreq_ctxclaim. The only remainingreq_names arereq_wland the request parametersrequest_context/request_details
- In -11 the claim is
-
issis OPTIONAL. It identifies the issuer when the signing key is not known in advance (§13.16) - Recipients MUST ignore claims they do not understand (§9.2)
TTS request (§11.1), RFC 8693 profile
Section titled “TTS request (§11.1), RFC 8693 profile”- Requests to a remote TTS over HTTP MUST use RFC 8693 (§5.1, §11)
- Required parameters:
grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchangeaudience: the Trust Domain namescope: the purposerequested_token_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_tokensubject_tokenandsubject_token_type
- RECOMMENDED parameters:
request_context(JSON →rctx) andrequest_details(JSON →tctx), sent form-urlencoded -
subject_token_type(§11.2):- Any type from RFC 8693 §3 is allowed except refresh_token
urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:self_signed(§11.2.1): a JWT that MUST containiss= requesting workload,sub,aud= TTS ID (the TTS SHALL check it),iat,expurn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:unsigned_json(§11.2.2):subMUST be present- Custom URNs are allowed
- Processing (§11.3), all MUST:
- Client authn and authorization
- Validation of the subject_token, including the signature if signed
- Uniqueness of
sub - Setting
iat,aud,exp,txn - Evaluation of scope
- MUST NOT issue from an expired subject_token (§6)
- Response (§11.4):
token_type=N_A,access_token= the Txn-Token,issued_token_type=...:txn_token.refresh_tokenMUST NOT be returned. Errors use the RFC 6749 §5.2 format - Mutual authentication MUST be used (§11.5). Asymmetric methods (RFC 7523, RFC 8705, WIMSE mTLS, HTTP-sig, WPT) SHOULD be used
- Exactly one logical TTS per Trust Domain (MUST, §10)
Propagation (§12)
Section titled “Propagation (§12)”- Header
Txn-Token:(MUST), carrying exactly one token. TheAuthorizationheader MUST NOT be used - The recipient MUST validate three things: the signature, that
audis its own domain, and that the token has not expired (§12.2) - Outbound calls MUST carry the received token unmodified
Security (§13)
Section titled “Security (§13)”- The lifetime MUST be short (§13.1). Replay is detected with
txn. A single-use check is optional (§13.2) - A Txn-Token MUST NOT embed an access token (§13.4)
- scope MUST NOT exceed the subject_token’s scope (§13.6). If the subject_token’s scope is unknown, the request MUST be rejected (§13.14)
- TTS configuration MUST come from a trusted source (§13.7). The TTS MUST be authenticated (§13.9)
- A Txn-Token MUST NOT be used as an authn credential (§13.12) or as an OAuth AT (§13.13)
- Replacement (§13.15), when a Txn-Token is passed as the subject_token:
- Narrowing and adding values MAY happen. Broadening MUST NOT
txn,sub,audMUST NOT change- An expired token MUST NOT be replaced
- The lifetime MAY be extended. If it is, the number of replacements SHOULD be limited
- The call chain MUST be preserved, but the method is out of scope
- A Txn-Token MUST NOT be logged in full (§15.2). Log a hash or the payload without the signature
- Identity-chaining SHOULD be used across domains (§14)
Recent changes
Section titled “Recent changes”- -11: history typo fix only
- -10: editorial changes to claim descriptions
- -09 (changes from -08):
- Added a TTS issuance policy section
- Added cross-domain guidance
- Added token revocation (introspection) to the considerations
- Removed the
rctx-specific claim definitions and renamed the section to Request Context - “Clarified” how
req_wlrepresents multiple workloads - Changed request parameters and body claims from OPTIONAL to RECOMMENDED
- -08: made
issalways OPTIONAL - Earlier:
- Renamed
purposetoscope - Renamed
azdtotctx - Removed the replacement text from the body and consolidated it into §13.15
- Renamed
Ambiguities
Section titled “Ambiguities”- In the §9.2 claim list,
tctxpoints to §9.2.2 andrctxto §9.2.3, but the sections are the other way round req_wl:- The history says the multiple-workload representation was clarified, but the body only says “A string value”
- The IANA registration (§16.2) lists only
tctxandrctx, notreq_wl
- The method for preserving the call chain on replacement is undefined. visado has to choose between concatenating
req_wland its own claim - The
audienceparameter (Trust Domain) and the self-signed JWTaud(TTS ID) are different values - How to compare scopes for “scope ≤ subject_token’s scope” is undefined. §9.2.1 allows internal scopes to mean something different from external ones, which sits awkwardly with that rule
- No type URN exists for a WIT or WPT as the subject_token, so it would be a custom URN
2. AIMS (draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01, Informational)
Section titled “2. AIMS (draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01, Informational)”Components (§5)
Section titled “Components (§5)”- 8 layers: Identifier → Credentials → Provisioning → Authentication → Authorization → Observability/Remediation → Policy → Compliance
- A conceptual model, not a protocol
- Roles:
- Agent (= workload, §4)
- LLM
- Tools/Services/Resources
- User/System (+ other Agents)
- IdP, AS/RS, TTS, external PDP (§10.4)
- posture verifier (§8)
- SSF receivers and monitoring systems (§11)
Specs combined per flow
Section titled “Specs combined per flow”| AIMS § | flow | specs combined |
|---|---|---|
| §6 | identifier | WIMSE ID. Exactly one per agent (MUST). May be a SPIFFE ID (MAY) |
| §7–8 | credential | WIT/WIC (WIMSE-CRED), X.509-SVID / JWT-SVID / WIT-SVID. Short-lived (SHOULD), exp required (MUST). LLM access to credentials MUST NOT be allowed |
| §9.1 / §9.2 | authentication | mTLS / WPT (wth) or WIMSE HTTP-sig (RFC 9421). Relay and replay considerations are MUST |
| §9.3 | long-running session | Re-validate on expiry. WPT per message |
| §10.2–10.5 | OAuth | authorization code and client credentials. Client authn via RFC 7523 / RFC 8705 / OAuth-SPIFFE. Users use a phishing-resistant method (SHOULD) |
| §10.4 | policy | AuthZEN. The token is one input to the decision. Sender-constrained (mTLS or DPoP) |
| §10.6 / §10.9 | internal propagation | Txn-Token and RFC 8693. Forwarding the AT is an anti-pattern |
| §10.7 | cross-domain | identity-chaining (SHOULD), ID-JAG, Txn-Token assertion grant |
| §10.8 | HITL | CIBA. A local UI confirmation alone MUST NOT count as authorization. Bind to the AS grant (MUST) |
| §10.11 | discovery | RFC 8414, RFC 9728, CIMD, RFC 7591 |
| §11 | monitoring and revocation | SSF / CAEP / RISC / WISE. Enforce on receiving a revocation (MUST). An invalidated cache MUST NOT be used |
Normative-ish parts
Section titled “Normative-ish parts”- Uppercase MUST/SHOULD appear in §6, §7, §8, §9.2.3, §10.x, §11, §13
- §1–5, §9.1, §9.3, §14–16 are descriptive only
- The whole document is Informational, so it reads as a recommended architecture, not as conformance requirements
Audit (§11)
Section titled “Audit (§11)”- Audit log: durable and tamper-evident (MUST)
- Minimum fields (MUST):
- authenticated agent ID
- delegating subject
- resource/tool
- action and decision
- timestamp and correlation ID
- posture/risk state
- remediation/revocation and its cause
- Reconstruction of the execution chain (SHOULD)
- Log tokens by ID or hash, not in full (§10.10)
PR #176 (ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-aims)
Section titled “PR #176 (ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-aims)”- Adds 5 paragraphs on “correlation and user identifiers in delegation chains” to §10.10 Privacy
- Status: open (created 2026-11-09, updated 11-17; reportedly to be settled at the 11-18 session)
- Points:
- Claims transcription (chaining §2.5) may emit a different subject ID outside the domain
- The mapping is kept in the audit record of the AS that did the transcription, not in the token
- The subject ID is the same across all hops within a domain and may change only when crossing domains
- The PR says it adds “no new normative text”, but it contains a MUST sentence (the same as an existing §10.10 sentence)
- Wording is not final
What AIMS does not have
Section titled “What AIMS does not have”- It defines neither the
actclaim nor agent→agent delegation chains - visado takes delegation chain validation from a separate draft (e.g. asor agent-delegation-chain)
What the reference implementation should demonstrate (inference)
Section titled “What the reference implementation should demonstrate (inference)”- The agent ID is a single WIMSE/SPIFFE ID, verifiable via WIT+WPT, HTTP-sig or mTLS
- An external AT or an ID-JAG-derived AT is exchanged for a Txn-Token and propagated downstream in the
Txn-Tokenheader (the AT is not forwarded) - scope only narrows, for both Txn-Token and chaining
- The AuthZEN PDP is queried with subject=agent (the delegating user goes in properties or context), and a deny stops the request
- Cross-domain uses ID-JAG / chaining
- A tamper-evident audit record (e.g. a hash chain) holds the 7 items from §11, with
txnas the correlation ID - (Optional) Caches are discarded on a CAEP revocation, and step-up uses CIBA
3. ID-JAG (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-06)
Section titled “3. ID-JAG (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-06)”Token exchange at the IdP (§4.3)
Section titled “Token exchange at the IdP (§4.3)”-
requested_token_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id-jag -
audience: the Resource AS issuer, exactly one (multiple →invalid_request, unknown →invalid_target, §4.3.3) -
resource: RECOMMENDED. If obtained from PRM, it MUST be sent unmodified -
scopeandauthorization_detailsare optional. scope has RS-side meaning, not OIDC scope meaning -
subject_token: the IdP MUST accept an ID Token (...:id_token) or SAML (...:saml2) and MAY accept an RT (...:refresh_token) -
actor_tokenis accepted, but no processing rules are defined (§9.10) - IdP validation:
- Client authn MUST succeed, otherwise
invalid_client - The subject_token is actually of the stated type
- The ID Token
audmatches the client_id - Reject if
typis a different kind (e.g.at+jwt) - The granted resource / scope / authorization_details MUST go into claims
- Client authn MUST succeed, otherwise
- Response:
issued_token_type=...:id-jag,token_type=N_A. If scope differs from the request, return scope
Claims (§3.1)
Section titled “Claims (§3.1)”- Header
typMUST beoauth-id-jag+jwt - REQUIRED:
iss,sub,aud(the RS-AS issuer),client_id(the client ID at the RS-AS),jti,exp,iat - OPTIONAL:
resource,scope,authorization_details,act,tenant,auth_time,acr,amr,aud_tenant,aud_sub,email,sub_id,cnf - A multi-tenant issuer MUST include
tenant(§6.1) subMUST be the same for the same RS-AS regardless of client (§5.2)
JWT bearer grant at the RS-AS (§4.4)
Section titled “JWT bearer grant at the RS-AS (§4.4)”-
grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer, or...:jwt-dpopwhen DPoP-bound -
assertion= the ID-JAG - A request with neither client authn nor sender-constraint MUST be rejected with
invalid_client - Validation (§4.4.1), in addition to RFC 7521 §5.2:
typ- trusted
iss audis its own issuer (if an array, exactly one element)client_idMUST match the authenticated client- If multi-tenant, check
tenant - If
cnfis present, check PoP: DPoP usesjkt, mTLS usesx5t#S256. Reject if unsupported resourceis under its own jurisdiction
- Metadata:
- RS-AS: list
urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-profile:id-jaginauthorization_grant_profiles_supported, and thengrant_types_supportedMUST include jwt-bearer - IdP: list id-jag in
identity_chaining_requested_token_types_supported. Ifid_jag_signing_alg_values_supportedis published, it MUST include RS256
- RS-AS: list
- The same ID-JAG MUST NOT be reused at a different downstream RS-AS (§9.4)
- Changes in -06: subject token validation errors changed from
invalid_granttoinvalid_request, and the draft explains whyaccess_deniedis used - Changes in -05: added jwt-dpop, mTLS binding, single audience,
invalid_target, and more
MCP Enterprise-Managed Authorization
Section titled “MCP Enterprise-Managed Authorization”Extension io.modelcontextprotocol/enterprise-managed-authorization, spec 2026-07-28.
- It references ID-JAG -04
- Additional requirements:
audienceMUST be the MCP AS issuer- If
resourceis included, it MUST be the MCP Server’s RFC 9728 resource ID and MUST also go in the ID-JAGresourceclaim - The AT MUST be audience-restricted to the MCP Server
- Discovery uses
authorization_grant_profiles_supported - An unregistered client may use a CIMD URL as its client_id
- The client declares the extension as a capability
- The client must not redirect to the MCP AS authorization endpoint
- No mention of DPoP
- The -06 changes (error codes, jwt-dpop) are not reflected on the MCP side
4. Identity Chaining (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17, RFC Ed Queue)
Section titled “4. Identity Chaining (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17, RFC Ed Queue)”- Token exchange at the A-AS: either
resource(the B-AS URI) oraudience(a logical name) is REQUIRED. Unknown values, or values policy does not allow, MUST be rejected per RFC 8693 §2.2.2 (§2.3.1–2) - The
audof the returned grant MUST identify the B-AS. A single aud is RECOMMENDED (§2.3.3) - The B-AS MUST validate per RFC 7523 §3, §3.1, and MUST match aud against its token endpoint or issuer. If the subject cannot be identified, it MUST reject (§2.4.2)
- The B-AS SHOULD NOT issue RTs (§5.4)
- Replay mitigations to evaluate: short lifetimes, single use, client authn (§5.5)
- Metadata:
identity_chaining_requested_token_types_supported(§3) - Claims transcription (§2.5): either AS can add, change or remove claims. The representation format is undefined. No scope escalation
5. AuthZEN Authorization API 1.0 (Final)
Section titled “5. AuthZEN Authorization API 1.0 (Final)”- Evaluation
POST /access/v1/evaluation(§6)- Request:
subject{type,id}: REQUIREDresource{type,id}: REQUIREDaction{name}: REQUIREDpropertiesandcontext: optional
- Response:
{decision:bool, context?} - On
false, the PEP MUST NOT proceed - A deny is HTTP 200, not an error
- Request:
- Evaluations
/access/v1/evaluations(§7)- Top-level values are defaults that item values override
options.evaluations_semantic:execute_all(default),deny_on_first_deny,permit_on_first_permit- Responses keep the request order. Per-item errors come back as decision=false with context
- Search
/access/v1/search/{subject|resource|action}(§8)- Omit the
idof the search target. If sent, it MUST be ignored - Pagination:
page.token/page.limit - Requests for later pages MUST be the same as the previous one
- The end is
next_token=""
- Omit the
- Metadata
GET /.well-known/authzen-configuration(§9)- REQUIRED:
policy_decision_pointandaccess_evaluation_endpoint - If
policy_decision_pointdoes not match the URL used to fetch it, the metadata MUST NOT be used - The endpoint values from metadata MUST be used
signed_metadatais optional
- REQUIRED:
- Transport (§10, §11)
- HTTPS POST, JSON object
X-Request-IDis RECOMMENDED, and the PDP MUST echo it- TLS MUST be used
- PEP authentication SHOULD be used (mTLS / OAuth / API key)
- Unknown fields MUST be ignored
- Errors: 400 / 401 / 403 / 500
Ambiguities (AuthZEN)
Section titled “Ambiguities (AuthZEN)”- How to carry agent delegation (user→agent) is undefined. The subject could be the agent or the user, and the delegation could go in
subject.propertiesorcontext- The WG draft MCP Tool Authorization profile and AARP (adopted 2026-06) are worth following
- When
decision=truecomes with context the PEP does not understand, the PEP MAY deny. visado has to pick a behavior
Cross-cutting open issues
Section titled “Cross-cutting open issues”- No type URN exists for a WIT/WPT or an ID-JAG-derived AT as a Txn-Token subject_token
- AIMS does not specify delegation chains (nested
act) - ID-JAG’s
acthas no processing rules either - Where to keep the subject mapping for audit is still under discussion in chaining transcription and AIMS PR #176
- MCP EMA (based on -04) and ID-JAG -06 diverge on error codes and DPoP handling
- AIMS Appendix A has history for -02 / -03, but datatracker only has -00 and -01 (presumably carried over from the predecessor klrc’s history)
Sources
Section titled “Sources”- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens/ (-11)
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant/ (-06)
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining/ (-17)
- https://github.com/ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-aims/pull/176
- https://modelcontextprotocol.io/extensions/auth/enterprise-managed-authorization
- https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ext-auth/blob/main/specification/stable/enterprise-managed-authorization/2026-07-28/enterprise-managed-authorization.mdx
- https://openid.net/specs/authorization-api-1_0.html
- https://openid.net/authorization-api-1-0-final-specification-approved/
© 2026 The visado Authors. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
Third-party logos are trademarks of their respective owners and are used to show compatibility; their use does not imply endorsement.