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Dex ID-JAG / Resource AS / OSS IdPs / SPIRE WIT: research (2026-11-18)

Dex ID-JAG issuance (#4611, merged 2026-11-11) is not in any Dex release. The latest is v2.46.1 (2026-10-21), with no newer tags or RCs, so it needs a master build. Two follow-ups merged on 2026-11-12: #5149 and #5150.

Dex only issues ID-JAGs. Its DEP lists the Resource AS role (RFC 7523) as a non-goal.

Keycloak’s experimental Resource AS (receiver) for ID-JAG first shipped in 26.7.0 (2026-07-09), not 26.6. 26.6 only has the generic RFC 7523 JWT Authorization Grant. The latest Keycloak is 26.8.2. Keycloak is the most realistic OSS Resource AS for a demo.

SPIRE v1.16.0 (2026-11-05) has experimental WIT-SVIDs (experimental { enable_wit_svids = true } on both server and agent), served by the Workload API FetchWITSVID. go-spiffe #415 (WPT minting) is still an open draft.

Sources: PR body and diff, gh pr diff 4611 --repo dexidp/dex.

  • oauth2.tokenExchange.tokenTypes: listing urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id-jag enables ID-JAG issuance. Other allowed values are ...:id_token and ...:access_token, which have no effect. Any other value is a config error.
  • expiry.idJAGTokens: Go duration. Default 5m.
  • staticClients[].idJAGPolicies: {allowedAudiences: [...], allowedScopes: [...]}
    • A client without a policy is denied.
    • Public clients cannot have a policy (config validation).
    • Policies exist only on static clients. DB/gRPC clients cannot get ID-JAGs. CEL-based policies are future work.
  • The token-exchange grant must be enabled, or the server refuses to start.
  • Discovery advertises identity_chaining_requested_token_types_supported: ["urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id-jag"].
  • id_jag_signing_alg_values_supported was removed (it is OPTIONAL in the draft).
  • Metrics: dex_id_jag_requests_total{result}, dex_id_jag_policy_rejections_total{reason}, dex_id_jag_scope_modifications_total.
  • grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange
  • requested_token_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id-jag
  • subject_token_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token: the only accepted type. It must be a Dex ID token issued to this same client (aud/azp is checked). Dex access tokens are ID-token-shaped and verify too, but the type string must still be id_token. Logout tokens are rejected.
  • audience: exactly one value. Must appear in some policy, otherwise invalid_target. Must be in this client’s policy, otherwise access_denied (400).
  • connector_id: REQUIRED. This is a Dex-specific parameter and must match the connector encoded in the subject token’s sub.
  • resource: at most 1. Must be an absolute URI with no fragment, otherwise invalid_target.
  • scope: intersected with allowedScopes. If some scopes were requested and none are allowed: invalid_scope.
  • Client authentication with a secret is required. A public client or one without a secret gets invalid_client (401).
  • If the session has ended for a session-bound client, the request is rejected.
  • Errors fixed after #4611:
    • #5150: a bad subject_token_type returns invalid_request.
    • #5149: requested_token_type is checked before the connector is called.

access_token=<ID-JAG>, issued_token_type=id-jag, token_type=N_A, expires_in. scope is returned only when it was reduced. No refresh token.

  • Header: typ: oauth-id-jag+jwt. Signed by Dex’s normal signer (local rotating keys or Vault), so it is verifiable through Dex jwks_uri (/keys). The algorithm is the signer’s (RS256 by default).
  • Claims:
    • iss: Dex issuer.
    • sub: the Dex ID-token sub, an opaque base64 protobuf of user ID and connector ID.
    • aud: a string, not an array.
    • client_id: the Dex client ID.
    • jti: UUID.
    • iat, exp.
    • Optional: resource, scope (space-joined), and email (only if email_verified).
  • Dex’s own verifiers refuse any token whose typ is set and is not JWT (#5150). So an ID-JAG cannot be used at userinfo, introspection or id_token_hint.

Deviations from / gaps vs draft-06 (latest, 2026-10-31)

Section titled “Deviations from / gaps vs draft-06 (latest, 2026-10-31)”
  • No SAML2 subject_token (the draft says the IdP MUST accept ID Token or SAML). No refresh_token subject (a MAY in the draft).
  • No authorization_details, actor_token/act, tenant, aud_tenant, aud_sub, sub_id, auth_time, acr or amr. No cnf / DPoP binding.
  • connector_id is a Dex-only extra required parameter.
  • The resource-vs-audience check is limited: Dex does not verify that resource is governed by audience.
  • Single resource only.
  • No step-up, and no server-side jti tracking.
  • sub is Dex’s opaque encoding, which the Resource AS must map. Inference: this matters for Keycloak’s user linking.

2. Resource AS requirements (draft-06 §4.4, RFC 7523)

Section titled “2. Resource AS requirements (draft-06 §4.4, RFC 7523)”
  • grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer (or jwt-dpop when bound), with assertion set to the ID-JAG.
  • The client SHOULD be authenticated. With neither client auth nor a sender-constrained ID-JAG, reject with invalid_client.
  • Validate:
    • typ == oauth-id-jag+jwt.
    • iss is a trusted IdP; keys come from its jwks_uri, and the alg must be allowed.
    • aud is exactly the Resource AS’s own issuer.
    • client_id equals the authenticated client.
    • exp, plus jti replay tracking.
    • tenant, if the issuer is multi-tenant.
    • cnf, if present.
    • resource is governed by this AS.
  • Failures return invalid_grant. A valid ID-JAG for an unauthorized user returns access_denied.
  • Scopes may be narrowed. SHOULD NOT issue a refresh token.
  • Metadata: authorization_grant_profiles_supported includes urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-profile:id-jag.
  • RS256 is MTI. ES256 SHOULD be supported.
  • Version: experimental receiver in 26.7.0 (release notes say “Keycloak provides partial experimental support… implements only the receiving authorization server role”). Enable with --features=identity-assertion-jwt.
  • Setup:
    • Register Dex as an IdP with jwtAuthorizationGrantEnabled=true, jwtAuthorizationGrantAssertionReuseAllowed=false and jwtAuthorizationGrantMaxAllowedAssertionExpiration=300.
    • On the client, set oauth2.jwt.authorization.grant.enabled=true and oauth2.jwt.authorization.grant.idp=<alias>.
    • Pre-link users via a federated identity whose userId = the ID-JAG sub. There is no JIT provisioning; otherwise the error is “User not found”.
  • Code (IDJWTAuthorizationGrantValidator):
    • Branches on the typ header.
    • Requires the client_id claim to equal the authenticating client’s clientId.
    • Requires iat.
    • Forces no reuse (jti).
    • Validates audience against the configured allowed audiences.
    • The client must be confidential.
  • Demo implications (inference):
    • The Dex static client id must equal the Keycloak client clientId.
    • Dex allowedAudiences should be the Keycloak realm issuer URL.
    • Dex’s default 5m TTL fits the 300s max.
  • The guide still says it is based on draft-01. Still open: issuer side (#48818, PR #49998), the authorization_grant_profiles_supported metadata (#54677), and promotion to preview (#49464).
  • Nothing else I found has ID-JAG-aware validation (typ, client_id binding).
  • Generic RFC 7523 grants (e.g. Ory Hydra’s jwt-bearer trust, or Keycloak 26.6’s JWT Authorization Grant) would accept the JWT but skip the ID-JAG-specific checks. That is inference; I did not test them.

Should visado be the Resource AS / Txn-Token Service? (my opinion, no source)

Section titled “Should visado be the Resource AS / Txn-Token Service? (my opinion, no source)”
  • Don’t make visado the Resource AS for the demo. The Resource AS is the SaaS app’s own authorization server, and Keycloak 26.7+ already covers it. That keeps the trust boundary obvious: Dex in domain A, Keycloak in domain B.
  • visado makes more sense as:
    • the ID-JAG client / requester (the agentgateway model), and/or
    • the PEP that checks Keycloak access tokens and then mints internal Txn-Tokens.
  • A Txn-Token Service inside a gateway is a reasonable choice for a demo, but it merges the PEP and the token issuer. Pulling it out later costs little if it sits behind a narrow interface.
  • Keycloak: issuance is not released. Issue #48818 and PR #49998 (issuer at token exchange; audience = clientId of the Resource AS client; no actor_token/resource) are both open. Docs issue #54330 is open. Umbrella #43971 is milestoned 27.0.
  • Casdoor: issuance is implemented.
    • #5996 closed 2026-10-29; commit 668c4d7b is included in v4.27.1+ (latest v4.29.0).
    • typ oauth-id-jag+jwt.
    • Claims: iss, sub, email, aud, client_id, resource, scope, jti, iat, exp (5m).
    • Policy is defined through Casdoor Permissions and is closed by default.
    • Not yet supported: SAML, discovery metadata, per-app TTL.
  • Authentik: PR #26973 “providers/oauth2: add id-jag” is open. Issue #25542 is open; #27759 was closed and points to #26973. Not released.
  • Zitadel: no ID-JAG issue or PR found. Token exchange issues exist (#7211, #13076).
  • Ory Hydra: no ID-JAG issue found. RFC 8693 is still open (#1218).
  • Authelia: no ID-JAG issue found. RFC 8693 is open (#2694).
  • Enable: experimental { enable_wit_svids = true } in both the server and agent config.
    • Server options: wit_issuer (sets iss; omitted if empty), which goes inside the experimental block (v1.16.0 rejects it at the server level as unknown configuration), and default_wit_svid_ttl (1h).
    • Agent option: wit_svid_cache_max_size (1000).
    • Per-entry WIT TTL (#7302).
    • The spire UpstreamAuthority publishes WIT keys for nested setups.
    • When disabled, the WIT APIs return Unimplemented.
  • Token:
    • Header: typ: wit+jwt, plus kid.
    • Claims: sub (SPIFFE ID), exp, iat, cnf.jwk (a public key with alg), and optional iss.
    • No jti. No aud; go-spiffe rejects a WIT that has one.
    • This matches draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03: sub, exp and cnf are required; iss is RECOMMENDED; jti is optional.
  • Workload API:
    • FetchWITSVID(WITSVIDRequest{spiffe_id}) streams WITSVID{spiffe_id, wit_svid (JWS), wit_svid_key (JWK private key), hint}. The agent generates the key; the workload does not bring its own.
    • FetchWITBundles streams JWKS documents keyed by trust domain.
    • CLI: spire-agent api fetch wit [-spiffeID]. With -output json it prints the WIT-SVIDs and the bundles. The private key JWK and the bundle keys carry no alg; the key in the WIT’s cnf.jwk does (ES256 by default). Checked against v1.16.0 in deploy/lab.
    • Agent rate limits: fetch_wit_svid, fetch_wit_bundles.
  • go-spiffe:
    • exp/svid/witsvid (parse/verify, typ check, cnf.jwk extraction), exp/bundle/witbundle and workloadapi/witsource.go exist on main.
    • PR #415 “Add exp/witwpt with WPT minting and policy helpers” is an open draft, last updated 2026-08-24, so visado has to verify WPTs (draft-ietf-wimse-wpt) itself for now.