visado: competitor/adjacent landscape (2026-11-18)
No project ships an AIMS-shaped composition (WIMSE WIT/WPT verification + agent delegation chain + Txn-Token minting + AuthZEN PEP) as one component. The pieces exist separately: zeroid (agent IdP/OBO), kontxt (Txn-Tokens behind agentgateway ext_authz), tokenetes (Txn-Tokens on K8s/SPIFFE, maintenance mode), agentgateway (JWT + CEL + an ext_authz-based AuthZEN PEP + RFC 8693).
The closest competitor is aramase/kontxt: Go, Txn-Token draft-08, an Envoy ext_authz adapter, and agentgateway as data plane. That is visado’s data path minus WIMSE/AIMS/AuthZEN. It has 26 stars, a single maintainer, and no push since 2026-06-12.
tokenetes is in maintenance mode, not archived. The main author has not committed since 2025-07. Since then the only activity is dependency/CI bumps (2026-07) by Atul Tulshibagwale, now at CrowdStrike.
Proxy foundation: no proxy of our own. tonic plus envoy-types for ext_authz (the primary mode) and axum for the token/AuthZEN HTTP endpoints. A standalone PEP, if one is needed later, would use hyper 1.x / hyper-util, not pingora.
Open-source teardown
Section titled “Open-source teardown”| Project | Lang / License | Stars / last push | Specs claimed | Overlap vs visado |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| tokenetes/tokenetes (ex-Tratteria) | Go / Apache-2.0 | 66 / 2026-10-29 | draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens | Txn-Token issuer only |
| highflame-ai/zeroid | Go / Apache-2.0 | 213 / 2026-11-18 | OAuth 2.1, RFC 8693/7523/9449/7591/9396/9068, CIBA, CIMD, ID-JAG, WIMSE/SPIFFE URIs, WIMSE proof tokens, SSF/CAE | Agent IdP and delegation; no Txn-Token, no AuthZEN PEP |
| alibaba/open-agent-auth | Java / Apache-2.0 | 92 / 2026-03-15 | draft-liu-agent-operation-authorization, draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds, OIDC, W3C VC, OPA | WIT use; own token (AOAT) |
| Delego-Dev/delego | Python / Apache-2.0 | 25 / 2026-06-11 | own “delego wire spec” 0.3 | Intent-bound action approval; not identity |
| microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit | Python (+Rust core) / MIT | 6,576 / 2026-11-17 | Own RFC-2119 specs (AgentMesh Identity & Trust), SPIFFE/DID/mTLS, OPA/Cedar | In-process SDK governance |
| Infisical/agent-vault | Go / MIT + ee/ | 2,515 / 2026-11-15 | none (MITM credential proxy) | Credential brokering; superseded by hosted product |
| kagenti -> rossoctl/rossoctl (AuthBridge) | Python/Go / Apache-2.0 | 304 / 2026-11-14 | RFC 8693, SPIFFE, Keycloak | Sidecar JWT validation + exchange |
| agentgateway/agentgateway | Rust / Apache-2.0 | 6,285 / 2026-11-18 (v1.7.0, 2026-10-27) | JWT/OIDC, MCP auth, RFC 8693, ID-JAG/XAA, AuthZEN (example), Envoy ext_authz/ext_proc | Data plane; visado’s host |
| IBM/mcp-context-forge | Python / Apache-2.0 | 4,849 / 2026-11-18 | OAuth, JWT, RFC 8693 token exchange, RBAC, plugins | MCP gateway/registry |
| stacklok/toolhive | Go / Apache-2.0 | 2,343 / 2026-11-18 | OIDC, RFC 8693/OBO, Cedar authz, embedded auth server with SPIFFE + ID-JAG | MCP runtime + authz |
| aramase/kontxt | Go / Apache-2.0 | 26 / 2026-06-12 | Txn-Tokens draft-08, RFC 8693, CEL | Closest twin |
| zalando-incubator/agentic-identity-broker | Go (+React UI) / MIT | 80 / 2026-11-18 (v0.1.147, 2026-11-17) | OAuth2 AS (proxy/local/hybrid), RFC 8693 exchange + impersonation, CIMD, DCR, PKCE, RFC 8707; CEL + OPA; Envoy ext_proc | Same gateway slot (agentgateway sidecar); consent/vault/3rd-party token focus |
tokenetes
Section titled “tokenetes”- Architecture: three parts: a TraT issuance service, a K8s controller (
tconfigd) for config CRDs, and per-service verification sidecars (tokenetes-agent). A gateway exchanges the user access token for a TraT. Repo layout isservice/,kubernetes/,docs/. - Hard-wired: CNCF/Palark both state that apps “must use SPIFFE for service-to-service trust”. Config flows through a K8s controller.
- Activity:
- v1.0.1 shipped 2025-07-21.
- The top contributor, kchiranjewee63 (98 commits), last committed 2025-07.
- The 2026 commits are a Go/crypto bump and a golangci v2 migration by
tulshi(Atul Tulshibagwale, profile: “Senior Director, Continuous Identity Strategy at CrowdStrike”, Txn-Token co-author and SSF/AuthZEN co-chair). - tokenetes-agent: last push 2025-04, 3 stars.
- Open issues (5): configurable
subclaim (#81, 2026-05), scope→purp(#78), a dependabot PR, and #86 opened by tulshi (2026-10). - CNCF health: “Concerning (46)”.
- SGNL: CrowdStrike announced the deal 2026-01-08 (~$740M) and closed it 2026-02-20.
- Verdict (inference): not abandoned on paper, but a single-person, maintainer-of-last-resort project with no feature work since 2025. It risks a CNCF archival review.
zeroid (Highflame)
Section titled “zeroid (Highflame)”- What it is: a full agent IdP with Postgres-backed OAuth AS (the Postgres part is inferred from
migrations/). - Tokens: the WIMSE URI is
sub, withspiffe://{domain}/{account}/{project}/{type}/{id}identities. - Delegation: RFC 8693 OBO with scope attenuation,
delegation_depth, and cascade revocation via SSF/CAE. - Other features: pluggable attestation, plus DPoP, CIMD and ID-JAG.
- Activity: created 2026-03, 66 open issues.
- vs visado: it issues identities; visado verifies and enforces. Complementary: zeroid could be an upstream issuer that visado validates. visado should not become an AS.
open-agent-auth (Alibaba)
Section titled “open-agent-auth (Alibaba)”- Three-layer binding: ID Token → WIT → AOAT.
- Request-level virtual workloads with temporary keys.
- W3C VC audit, OPA/RAM/ACL policy.
- Spring/Java, public beta, quiet since 2026-03.
- Spec: an individual draft (draft-liu-…), not the WG direction.
delego
Section titled “delego”- Deterministic intent-hash binding.
- Single-use approvals bound to an action fingerprint.
- Ed25519 hash-chained audit.
- Rides credential brokers (explicitly Agent Vault).
- Not identity. It is a possible AuthZEN PDP-side idea, not a competitor.
Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit
Section titled “Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit”- Pip-installable in-process governance: policy (YAML/OPA/Cedar via the “Agent Control Specification”, Rust core), identity “SPIFFE/DID/mTLS” (e.g.
did:mesh:agent-1), trust scoring, audit, an MCP security gateway. - SDKs in five languages, many stars.
- Own specs, no IETF Txn-Token/AuthZEN (code search: 0 AuthZEN hits).
- vs visado: SDK-in-the-agent vs network PEP. Different layer.
Infisical agent-vault
Section titled “Infisical agent-vault”- MITM HTTP credential proxy: agents never hold secrets.
- The README now says the OSS repo is “no longer recommended”, in favor of hosted Infisical Agent Vault.
- License: MIT core +
ee/. - Orthogonal: secret injection, not identity verification.
Kagenti → now “rossoctl” (IBM-led)
Section titled “Kagenti → now “rossoctl” (IBM-led)”kagenti/kagentiredirects torossoctl/rossoctl.- AuthBridge sidecar setup: an operator injects Envoy + a Go processor + spiffe-helper + Keycloak client registration.
- Inbound plugin
jwt-validation, outbound plugintoken-exchange(RFC 8693, audience-scoped). - Maintainers are IBM Research. “Road to CNCF” is listed in the leads’ responsibilities.
- vs visado:
- Keycloak-centric exchange, no Txn-Token/WIMSE WIT verification.
- Potential consumer of visado as its ext_authz.
- Watch for CNCF positioning collision.
agentgateway (Linux Foundation, Solo.io-originated)
Section titled “agentgateway (Linux Foundation, Solo.io-originated)”- Security policies: JWT, basic, API key, OIDC browser auth, HTTP and network CEL authorization, MCP authentication (OAuth 2.0/JWT), MCP authorization (CEL over
mcp.tool.nameetc.), backend auth, CSRF, CORS, external authorization. - Code:
http/{jwt,ext_authz,ext_proc,authorization,oauth}.rs,auth/oauth/cross_app_access.rs(ID-JAG). - Extension points:
- Envoy-compatible
extAuthz, gRPC or HTTP. It supportsincludeRequestHeaders, a body, CELmetadata,includeResponseHeaders, conditional per-mcp.tool. extProc.ExtMcp, a new gRPC service “modeled on Envoy ext_authz, but at the MCP method layer”.CheckRequestgets method, params, headers and CEL metadata. It returns pass/mutated/error plus aHeaderMutationand a KV bag exposed asextMcp.<key>to CEL.CredentialProvider.FetchSecret(uri, actor_spiffe_id).
- Envoy-compatible
- AuthZEN:
examples/mcp-authzenalready makes agentgateway an AuthZEN PEP (ext_authz HTTP mode with a CEL-built AuthZEN body, Keycloak as PDP) and does RFC 8693oauthTokenExchangefor backend auth. - No WIMSE, no Txn-Token (code search 0 hits).
IBM mcp-context-forge
Section titled “IBM mcp-context-forge”- Python MCP/A2A/REST gateway and registry.
- Auth: basic, JWT (symmetric
JWT_SECRET_KEYby default), OAuth with token-exchange service and cache, RBAC, plugin framework. - No AuthZEN. SPIFFE appears only in plugin docs.
stacklok toolhive
Section titled “stacklok toolhive”- MCP server runtime with per-request authn/authz.
pkg/authhasobo,upstreamswap,tokensource,awssts,dcr.pkg/authzuses Cedar (plus an HTTP authorizer).pkg/authserveris an embedded AS with SPIFFE bundle sources, ID-JAG, authorization_details and delegated-agent flows.- It is drifting toward the agent-IdP space.
kontxt (Anish Ramasekar, aramase)
Section titled “kontxt (Anish Ramasekar, aramase)”- Components: TTS (RFC 8693 →
txntoken+jwt,tctx/rctx, CEL issuance rules), an ext_authz adapter with generation and verification modes, a controller, and a Go SDK. - CRDs:
TxTokenConfig,TransactionType,ServiceTokenRequirement,TokenPolicy. - Integrations: agentgateway standalone or the
istio-agentgatewayGatewayClass. - Inference: the author is a K8s SIG-Auth maintainer at Microsoft. I did not verify the affiliation via his GitHub profile.
- Hard-wired:
req_wl= K8s SA, K8s-only.
zalando-incubator/agentic-identity-broker (high priority)
Section titled “zalando-incubator/agentic-identity-broker (high priority)”- Basics:
- Go + React consent SPA, MIT, 80 stars.
- Created 2026-07-09, pushed 2026-11-18, release v0.1.147 (2026-11-17). Fast cadence: 94 open issues, ADRs up to 047, spec-kit
specs/.
- Governance: MAINTAINERS lists only two core maintainers, both @zalando.de (Magnus Jungsbluth, Jan Brennenstuhl). They hold 207 of ~280 commits. In practice Zalando-only, in the zalando-incubator org.
- What it is:
- Consent-driven OAuth2 broker plus a token vault for third-party SaaS tokens (Google, GitHub, Databricks, Linear).
- Tokens are envelope-encrypted with AWS KMS + DynamoDB; app data lives in Postgres.
- User auth is delegated to a trusted reverse proxy (principal header/JWT). The broker itself does not authenticate users.
- OAuth2 server modes:
proxy(front an upstream AS),local(mint its own JWTs with managed asymmetric keys + JWKS),hybrid. - CIMD inbound and outbound (
private_key_jwt), DCR, PKCE.
- Delegation chain representation:
- Not a token chain. Delegation is a stored Grant (principal → agent → permission sets across services, at most one active grant per user+agent, optional
valid_until) plus a shared per-user-per-service session. - The subject token carries the user (
sub) and agent (azp) via configurable CEL extraction. - Only “impersonation” (Feature 037/ADR 045) mints a broker JWT with a single-level
act.iss/act.sub(privileged client such as a Slack bridge acting for a user). - No nested
act, no agent→agent multi-hop.
- Not a token chain. Delegation is a stored Grant (principal → agent → permission sets across services, at most one active grant per user+agent, optional
- Tokens minted:
- Local JWT access tokens (
agent_id,sub,scope, optionalact). - JWE session tokens during authorization.
- Otherwise it returns the third-party provider’s access token from the vault via RFC 8693.
- Local JWT access tokens (
- Specs absent: ARCHITECTURE.md and the docs site have zero mentions of Txn-Token, WIMSE, SPIFFE, AuthZEN or ID-JAG (grep of the full ARCHITECTURE.md, plus the docs intro and delegation pages).
- agentgateway integration:
- A standalone
extproc-token-exchangebinary implements Envoy ext_proc (not ext_authz). - agentgateway does
jwtAuthand puts the raw token + resource URI into trustedaib.tokenexchangemetadata. - ExtProc calls the broker’s
/oauth2/token(RFC 8693, gateway authenticated byclient_assertion). It replacesAuthorization: Bearer <exchanged>and caches by (subjectToken, resourceURI) with singleflight. - Three fail-closed gates:
- Broker CEL on the exchange.
- Embedded OPA in ExtProc on the request/MCP body.
- A human tool-approval gate (long-poll synced).
- Re-auth is an MCP 403
insufficient_scope+ elicitation challenge.
- A standalone
- Overlap with visado:
- Same deployment slot: a gRPC sidecar to agentgateway that validates the inbound JWT and swaps the outbound credential.
- Both claim “delegation chains for on-behalf-of”.
- Both do per-request policy (OPA/CEL vs AuthZEN).
- Both do MCP tool-level gating.
- Differences:
- It is user-consent and SaaS-credential-vault centric (outbound to external OAuth providers). visado is workload-identity and intra-domain-call-chain centric.
- Identity: it trusts bearer JWTs + a proxy header. visado verifies WIMSE WIT/WPT / SVID proof of possession.
- Chains: its delegation is a DB grant, plus single
actfor impersonation. visado verifies a cryptographic multi-hop chain in tokens. - Output: it injects a third-party access token. visado mints a Txn-Token.
- Policy: its PDP is embedded OPA/CEL. visado uses an external, standard AuthZEN PDP.
- Protocol: ext_proc (streaming, body access) vs visado’s ext_authz (single Check).
- It is a stateful app (Postgres, KMS, DynamoDB, UI). visado should stay near-stateless.
- Positioning (inference): complementary. visado sits in front (verify agent workload + chain → AuthZEN → Txn-Token for internal hops). The broker sits at the egress to third-party SaaS. visado should not build a consent UI or a token vault. A possible interop demo: a visado-issued Txn-Token / verified chain as the broker’s subject token.
- Sources: https://github.com/zalando-incubator/agentic-identity-broker (ARCHITECTURE.md, MAINTAINERS, README), https://agenticidentitybroker.dev/docs/introduction , https://agenticidentitybroker.dev/docs/concepts/delegation-and-consent
Commercial
Section titled “Commercial”- Aembit: Workload IAM extended to “IAM for Agentic AI”. GA April 2026. Blended Identity (agent+human), managed MCP Authorization Server (OAuth 2.1 / DCR), MCP Identity Gateway VM, secretless credential injection. CrowdStrike AIDR integration (2026-09).
- Keycard: launched 2025-10 with $38M (a16z, Acrew, Boldstart). Founders ex-Snyk and Auth0 (Jared Hanson). Task-scoped short-lived tokens, policy at runtime, SDKs, “federated trust fabric”. Fortune Cyber 60 (2026-10).
- Astrix: NHI discovery-first. The Agent Control Plane is pre-approved profiles + short-lived creds. Agent Policies (allow/flag/block) launched at RSAC 2026. Posture/inventory, not a protocol PEP.
- Defakto (ex-SPIRL): SPIFFE/WIMSE-grounded NHI platform, Series B $30.75M (2025-10). Pieter Kasselman (Defakto) is lead author of draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01 (2026-11-02). They are the most likely commercial AIMS implementer. visado can be the vendor-neutral OSS reference, with Defakto invited as reviewers.
Integration points
Section titled “Integration points”Envoy ext_authz v3 (gRPC)
Section titled “Envoy ext_authz v3 (gRPC)”- Service: implement
envoy.service.auth.v3.Authorization/Check(CheckRequest) -> CheckResponse. - Input:
CheckRequest.attributes(AttributeContext). Headers, path and the optional body live underattributes.request.http. Peer certificate/principal is inattributes.source. Routecontext_extensionsandmetadata_contextare also present. - Allow and inject a Txn-Token:
status=OK+ok_response:headers:Txn-Token: <jwt>viaHeaderValueOption. The docs sayappenddefaults false = overwrite. In current core v3, useappend_action: OVERWRITE_IF_EXISTS_OR_ADD.headers_to_remove: the inboundAuthorization/ client-suppliedTxn-Tokenand WIMSE headers, so credentials aren’t forwarded.- Also available:
response_headers_to_add,query_parameters_to_set/remove.
- Deny:
denied_response{status, headers (e.g. WWW-Authenticate), body}. - Error:
error_response, which honorsfailure_mode_allow. - Metadata:
CheckResponse.dynamic_metadatalands underenvoy.filters.http.ext_authzfor downstream filters and logs. Put txn id / agent chain there. - Ordering: only one of denied/ok/error may be set.
- Rust:
envoy-types0.7.7 (pre-compiled protos, tonicAuthorizationServer,CheckRequestExt/CheckResponseExthelpers, MSRV 1.88) +tonic0.14.9. - Envoy config: set
with_request_bodyif WPT/HTTP-sig verification needs the body digest.
agentgateway
Section titled “agentgateway”- Same ext_authz proto (it vendors
ext_authz.proto), so one server covers Envoy, Istio and agentgateway. - An ExtMcp implementation can come later for MCP-method-aware decisions (tool name/args into the AuthZEN
resource/action). - Its native AuthZEN example is a CEL-templated HTTP call. visado’s value is doing it with verified identity + chain + Txn-Token issuance in one hop.
- Register in
meshConfig.extensionProviders[].envoyExtAuthzGrpc{service,port}. - Attach with
AuthorizationPolicy action: CUSTOM, provider.name. Only ext_authz is supported. Off-mesh authorizers need a ServiceEntry. - kontxt shows the
istio-agentgatewayGatewayClass path.
Rust crates (crates.io, 2026-11-18)
Section titled “Rust crates (crates.io, 2026-11-18)”| Crate | Version | Updated |
|---|---|---|
| tonic | 0.14.9 | 2026-10 |
| envoy-types | 0.7.7 | 2026-09 |
| hyper | 1.12.0 | 2026-10 |
| axum | 0.8.9 | 2026-04 |
| pingora | 0.9.1 | 2026-11, 27.9k stars |
| rustls | 0.23.46 | 2026-11 |
| jsonwebtoken | 12.0.0 | 2026-11 |
| josekit | 0.10.3 | 2025-05, OpenSSL-backed, stale |
| spiffe | 0.19.0 | 2026-10, Workload API / SVIDs |
- JOSE: use jsonwebtoken 12 for JWS sign/verify, or a thin layer over
aws-lc-rs/ring. josekit pulls OpenSSL and is stale. - HTTP Message Signatures (WIMSE WPT alt): I did not survey crate maturity. visado will probably implement RFC 9421 itself.
Proxy foundation recommendation
Section titled “Proxy foundation recommendation”- Primary: no proxy. visado = tonic ext_authz server + axum HTTP surface (token endpoint, AuthZEN client, JWKS, health). Envoy, Istio and agentgateway all speak ext_authz, and agentgateway already is the Rust agent data plane (6.3k stars, LF). Competing with it would lose.
- If a standalone PEP mode is needed: hyper 1.x + hyper-util + tower + rustls.
- Same Tokio/tower stack as tonic/axum, so ext_authz logic can be reused as a tower layer.
- rustls is first-class.
- Small dependency and audit surface for a security component.
- Avoid pingora for now.
- Its own server lifecycle/runtime model doesn’t compose with tonic/axum.
- rustls support is still labeled “experimental”; default builds want OpenSSL/BoringSSL (clang/perl).
- It is built for high-throughput CDN-style proxying, which visado doesn’t need.
- axum is an app framework, not a proxy. Use it for endpoints only.
Differentiation
Section titled “Differentiation”No other open, vendor-neutral Rust implementation found in this survey composes the AIMS stack end to end at the enforcement point. It verifies WIMSE workload credentials (WIT + WPT / HTTP-sig proof of possession) and SPIFFE SVIDs. It validates the agent delegation chain (RFC 8693 act nesting / ID-JAG from any issuer such as zeroid, Keycloak or Okta). It asks an AuthZEN PDP for the decision, and mints a draft-conformant Txn-Token carrying the verified chain and context. All of this happens in one ext_authz call that works in Envoy, Istio and agentgateway unchanged. Competitors each cover one slice:
- tokenetes/kontxt: Txn-Tokens, K8s-only, no WIMSE/AuthZEN.
- zeroid/toolhive authserver: issuance.
- agentgateway: CEL policy + a templated AuthZEN example.
- AGT: in-process SDK.
- Aembit/Keycard/Defakto: closed SaaS.
visado should be the spec-tracking conformance reference (test vectors, interop with draft revisions), not another platform.
Things to avoid overlapping
Section titled “Things to avoid overlapping”- Not an OAuth AS / agent IdP: no client registration, DCR, CIBA, consent (zeroid, toolhive authserver, Keycloak). Mint only Txn-Tokens.
- Not a data plane/gateway: no routing, MCP multiplexing, LLM proxying (agentgateway, context-forge, toolhive).
- Not a policy engine: be the AuthZEN PEP/client. Ship at most a trivial test PDP (Cedar/OPA/AGT ACS live elsewhere).
- Not a credential vault/broker, consent UI, or secret injector (Agent Vault, Zalando agentic-identity-broker, agentgateway CredentialProvider, Aembit). The Zalando broker owns user consent + third-party SaaS token vault behind agentgateway ext_proc. visado stays ext_authz + Txn-Token for internal hops.
- Not a K8s operator/CRD suite in v1 (kontxt, tokenetes, rossoctl). Keep config file/xDS-free and portable. K8s comes later as packaging.
- Not intent/HITL approval or prompt inspection (delego, AGT, Astrix posture).
- Don’t fork tokenetes. Offer migration notes instead, and possibly co-maintainership or a conformance-suite collaboration with Atul Tulshibagwale / the kontxt author.
Confidence / gaps
Section titled “Confidence / gaps”- Star counts and dates are from GitHub API on 2026-11-18.
- Commercial capability claims come mostly from vendor blogs and press.
- kontxt author affiliation is inference.
- Pingora rustls status is as stated in its current README.
Sources
Section titled “Sources”- tokenetes: https://github.com/tokenetes/tokenetes , https://www.cncf.io/projects/tokenetes/ , https://palark.com/blog/cncf-sandbox-2025-jan/ , https://github.com/cncf/sandbox/issues/115 , https://github.com/tulshi
- SGNL deal: https://ir.crowdstrike.com/news-releases/news-release-details/crowdstrike-acquire-sgnl-transform-identity-security-ai-era , https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/08/crowdstrike-ai-cybersecurity-sgnl-acquisition.html , https://app.dealroom.co/news/note/crowdstrike-acquires-sgnl-for-637-1m-sec-feb-2026
- https://github.com/highflame-ai/zeroid
- https://github.com/alibaba/open-agent-auth
- https://github.com/Delego-Dev/delego
- https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit
- https://github.com/Infisical/agent-vault
- https://github.com/rossoctl/rossoctl (docs/security/authbridge.md, MAINTAINERS.md)
- agentgateway: https://github.com/agentgateway/agentgateway (crates/protos/proto/ext_mcp.proto, credprovider.proto, examples/mcp-authzen) , https://agentgateway.dev/docs/standalone/latest/documentation/configuration/security/ , https://agentgateway.dev/docs/standalone/latest/documentation/mcp/mcp-authz/
- https://github.com/IBM/mcp-context-forge
- https://github.com/stacklok/toolhive
- https://github.com/aramase/kontxt
- https://github.com/zalando-incubator/agentic-identity-broker , https://agenticidentitybroker.dev/docs/introduction , https://agenticidentitybroker.dev/docs/concepts/delegation-and-consent
- Aembit: https://aembit.io/blog/aembit-iam-for-agentic-ai-is-now-generally-available/
- Keycard: https://finance.yahoo.com/news/keycard-launches-solve-ai-agent-130900959.html , https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/10/28/3390586/0/en/keycard-named-to-the-fortune-cyber-60-one-year-after-launching-identity-and-access-for-ai-agents.html
- Astrix: https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/03/23/astrix-security-ai-agent-security-platform-expansion/ , https://astrix.security/learn/blog/meet-ai-agent-control-plane/
- Defakto: https://www.defakto.security/blog/introducing-defakto-the-future-of-non-human-identity-security/ , https://fintech.global/2025/10/27/defakto-raises-30-75m-to-secure-non-human-identities/
- AIMS: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-wimse-aims/
- Envoy: https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-v3/service/auth/v3/external_auth.proto
- Istio: https://istio.io/latest/docs/tasks/security/authorization/authz-custom/
- Rust: https://github.com/flemosr/envoy-types , https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora , https://crates.io/crates/tonic , https://crates.io/crates/jsonwebtoken , https://crates.io/crates/spiffe
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